Showing posts with label internet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label internet. Show all posts

Monday, 31 August 2020

Researchers achieve fastest-ever internet speed that could download all of Netflix in one second

Increased speeds required to match growing amounts of data, researchers note

Researchers have created the fastest-ever internet connection, much quicker than any ever successfully tried before.

The team behind the breakthrough, from University College London, were able to transmit data at 178 terabits per second. The speed is double the capacity of any system currently used in the world, and a fifth faster than the previous record.

The connection is so fast that it would be able to download the entire Netflix library in just one second.

It is also getting close to the theoretical limit of data transmission, first proposed by American mathematician Claude Shannon in 1949.

The increased speed is possible because the researchers were able to transmit data through a much wider range of colours than normally used in optical fibre. By combining different amplfiier technologies, they could make the best use of the properties of light that transmitted the data, allowing them to specifically manipulate each individual wavelength.

It remains at the level of proof of concept: home broadband customers are unlikely to find their internet connections speeding up to those levels any time soon.

But the researchers who created it note that it would be relatively easy to use the technology on existing infrastructure, and that it would be reasonably cost effective to do so. All that is needed is to upgrade the amplifiers that are used on optical fibre routes – adding new amplifiers would cost £16,000, compared to the £450,000 per kilometre that it can cost to install new fibres.

Such increases in speed will be required in the future as the amount of data used and transmitted increases, the researchers note. As it becomes easier to create and store information, it will also become more important to be able to meet demands for data transfer rates, they note – and it is likely that such speeds will also be required for "as yet unthought-of applications that will transform people’s lives", said UCL's Lidia Galdino, lead author on the new paper.

The breakthrough is reported in IEEE Photonics Technology Letters, under the title 'Optical Fibre Capacity Optimisation via Continuous Bandwidth Amplification and Geometric Shaping'.

(Source: The Independent)

Saturday, 23 May 2020

How we met: 'I had this surge of adrenaline. I just had to get to know her'

Andrew and Tanja Bone, 61 and 55, met in Sarajevo during the Bosnian war. They live in Scotland with their two rescue dogs

Andrew Bone was working as a truck driver for the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1993, distributing food and medicine to war-torn areas of Bosnia. At the end of the year, he flew to Sarajevo to cover for another staff member. “It was a desperate situation to fly into,” he says. “I was whisked straight up to the organisation’s headquarters in a bullet-proof Land Rover.” That’s where he spotted Tanja Todorovic for the first time. “I had this surge of adrenaline. I just felt that I had to get to know her. It sounds like a silly fairytale but it’s true.”

At the time, Tanja was working as a senior field officer for the charity. Andrew got the chance to speak to her properly when they were sent to deliver aid to a home for people with learning disabilities. “Andy was so kind to the people who lived there,” says Tanja. “He was handsome too. All this long, blonde, curly hair. It’s all gone now, of course,” she laughs.

Shortly afterwards, Tanja had to go to Pale for a work mission and asked Andrew to be her driver. “The road back was shelled while we were there,” he says. “We ended up having to spend the night in Pale. We had drinks together and that’s the night that we started our relationship.”
Andrew and Tanja Bone: ‘Meeting each other has been truly life-changing.’ Photograph: provided by Tanja Bone

A couple of weeks later, Andrew’s cover came to an end and he was sent back to Zagreb. “I was distraught. I went to the radio room and begged the operators to let me talk to her.” They told him it was impossible. “Eventually though they said they were nipping out for coffee and I was able to get hold of Tanja to tell her I loved her.”

Shortly afterwards, Tanja travelled to Zagreb to meet Andrew. “I had a Red Cross passport, which meant I was able to travel out of the war zone,” she explains. They discussed the future of their relationship and whether Tanja should return to Sarajevo. They knew they wanted to be together and had big decisions to make.

The situation was complicated by the fact that they were both married at the time. “My marriage wasn’t working out and Tanja was separated but it was really hard,” says Andrew. “Back then, Britain was sympathetic to refugees coming from Bosnia, so we decided it would be best to come here and be together, away from the war.”

Tanja applied for asylum and the pair were able to marry at the end of 1994, once their divorces were finalised. “I then got indefinite leave to remain and in 1999 I got my British citizenship,” she says.
Over the next 10 years, they moved around the UK, living in Norfolk, London, Leicester and Scotland. Andrew continued to work as a truck driver, while Tanja took on various roles including working for the Refugee Council and launching an organic fruit and vegetable shop in Leicester.

In 2004, she went back to university to train as a nurse and the couple moved to London. However, they soon realised they weren’t ready to stop exploring. “From 2009 to 2019, we travelled around the UK by boat, moving from place to place,” says Tanja. They worked when they needed to and enjoyed their nomadic lifestyle.

When Andrew became ill with cancer 18 months ago, they moved to a permanent base in Dumbarton, Scotland. “I feel really lucky to have had such incredible care at the hands of the NHS. I had some surgery just before lockdown and they now think I am cancer-free,” he says. Tanja is still working as a nurse, and the pair have been enjoying daily walks together. “We love the countryside here,” says Tanja. “When it’s safe, we will go back to hiking in the Highlands.”

It’s been 26 years since they met, but Andrew says he is more in love than ever. “She is my best friend and my everything. Nothing has changed for me since the moment we met.” Tanja feels the same. “Meeting each other has been truly life-changing. It’s the best thing that’s ever happened for either of us.”

(Source: The Guardian)

Saturday, 9 May 2020

60 young people subject to footage of child abuse after Zoom call hacked

Login details for online fitness class held by Plymouth sports club shared on internet forums, say Devon and Cornwall Police

Around 60 young people were subject to footage of child sex abuse after an online fitness class held via Zoom was hacked, police have said.

The session was being staged on the conferencing platform by a Plymouth sports club on Tuesday morning when an unauthorised person managed to gain access.

Footage of the abuse was then streamed to those present in the video group call, in what is the latest incident of ‘zoombombing’.

Devon and Cornwall Police believe the culprit was able to hack the Zoom session after the group’s login details were shared on open internet forums.

Officers are now working with the city council’s social care team to identify those who have been affected by the incident.

Detective inspector Lesley Bulley, of the Plymouth Public Protection Unit, said: “We are progressing enquiries to identify the suspect in this distressing offence for all concerned.

“We are working closely with Plymouth Safeguarding Children’s Partnership and I request that, if you have been affected by this, then you come forward and let us know who you are so we can provide the necessary advice and support.”

Zoom, a US-based video-conferencing firm, has been subject to widespread hacks as millions have turned to the platform for work and leisure while under lockdown during the coronavirus pandemic.

Reports have emerged of trolls disrupting conferences with offensive content, including racist and homophobic imagery.

Devon and Cornwall Police has issued advice over online video conferencing, urging users to only download apps from trusted sources, such as the Apple App Store and Google Play, and make sure account passwords are unique and complex.

Cyber protect officer Grahame Mace said: “Keeping in touch with our friends and family is vital during this period of lockdown. But please ensure when setting up video conferencing sessions that you follow the guidelines on keeping your sessions private.

“First and foremost understand what security settings you have implemented and are available for your software, don’t leave yourself or others vulnerable, lock it down and keep the criminals out.”

Last week, an online wine testing event streamed via Zoom was hacked and similarly exposed to footage of child pornography.

Manchester-based wine merchant Grain To Grape had been hosting the conference call on Saturday night, with roughly 70 people logged-in, when the hack occurred 25 minutes into the session.

Owner Tom Sneesby described the hack as “cowardly and villainous”.

“It’s the most repugnant, the most foul and haunting stuff you can see,” he told the Manchester Evening News. “That’s why it was chosen. It’s the worst thing you can put in front of normal people.”

Zoom said on Wednesday that it is implementing new security measures as it battles to prevent hackers from ‘zoombombing’ video calls.

An update aimed at free users of the platform will be implemented on 9 May, while a new level of encryption will also be introduced from 30 May, which Zoom says will “provide increased protection for meeting data and resistance against tampering”.

The company has been attempting to toughen up its security ever since it vowed to fix its “biggest trust, safety and privacy” issues in April.

(Source: Independent)

Tuesday, 3 December 2019

Massive Iranian internet shutdown could be harbinger of something even darker to come, experts warn

Tehran officials have been laying groundwork to potentially cut off ordinary Iranians from the wider internet, writes Borzou Daragahi on the Independent. Read on: 

The Iranian regime’s draconian week-long shutdown of the internet during nationwide anti-government protests this month cost the country’s struggling economy an estimated $1.5bn.

But the price tag may not even be the most damaging aspect of the cutoff, and it may only be a harbinger of worse things to come as the regime seeks to restrict the Iranian public’s access to the world, according to experts and leaks.

“The worst side effect is not direct financial loss,” says the chief executive of a north-central Tehran technology firm which employs 10 people. “The worst thing is that nearly all of my friends are looking for a way to leave the country now.”

The internet blackout was meant to halt the dissemination of information about the protests and videos showing protesters angered by a sudden and dramatic hike in fuel prices battling regime forces.

Despite Iran having removed fuel subsidies and raised petroleum prices in part to boost the economy, the subsequent crackdown may end up damaging it even more.

Violence by security forces left at least 143 people dead, according to Amnesty International. Among those killed was 27-year-old Pouya Bakhtiari, allegedly shot dead by security forces on 16 November in the northern city of Karaj, where some nine people were killed in total. His killing came after he recorded a video, now spreading online, urging Iranians to take to the streets.

The internet manoeuvre effectively cut the country off from the rest of the planet, stifling the ability of friends and family members from communicating with each other, and from commerce from taking place.

To many, it showed the extreme measures the regime’s elite were willing to take to cling to power and cover up alleged crimes by security forces. Even Iran’s relatively moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, endorsed the political repression, betraying the largely middle class urbanites who twice voted for him over nominal hardline candidates.
Iranians, pictured on their phones in Tehran, are struggling to adjust to life offline ( AFP/Getty )

Western officials condemned the shutdown but the United States has been alone in imposing sanctions. The US Treasury Department this week put restrictions on any dealings with Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, Iran’s minister of telecommunications.

“Despite proclamations that he supports expanded internet access in Iran, Azari-Jahromi has repeatedly justified the increasingly restrictive measures of his ministry as necessary to maintain national security, and further claimed that they are based on foreign threats to overthrow the regime,” said the Treasury statement.

“They shut off the internet so that they could engage in activities essentially in the dark, without communications,” US secretary of state Mike Pompeo said in a radio interview this week.

According to a leaked document that was confirmed as authentic by the BBC, Iran could be planning to even more tightly control the internet and is already working out plans with state institutions to permit them to have access to global internet tools and sites while blocking access for ordinary Iranians, who would be directed to use a tightly monitored domestic internet network.

Experts say that Tehran officials, even as they themselves use western social media to promote their geopolitical agenda, have been laying the groundwork to potentially cut off ordinary Iranians from the wider internet in what is officially being called the National Internet Network – officials deny it will be the sole internet.

“Developments over the past 10 years have been preparing for a scenario where they could implement such a shutdown, and over the past two years alone policies and developments, especially regarding the National Information Network, have indicated this would be the case,” says Mahsa Alimardani, a researcher focusing on internet freedom in Iran at Oxford University, and at Article 19, a free-speech advocacy group.

“Every mass protest movement in Iran, since the first one in the internet age in 2009, has resulted in further centralisation and regulation of the internet space,” she says.

Azari-Jahromi, the telecommunications minister, has denied such a plan exists. But on Friday, hardline prayer leader Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari told regime acolytes gathered at Tehran University that the internet shutdown was a “promising test” before full implementation of the National Information Network, which he said needed to be accelerated.

Some scholars and analysts have sought to ascertain the direct financial impact of the recent shutdown. Estimates of the damage to the economy range from $370m (£286m) per day to more than $1bn in total. The reformist daily newspaper Mardom Salari published a report estimating $1.5bn in damage.

Every mass protest movement in Iran, since the first one in the internet age in 2009, has resulted in further centralisation and regulation of the internet space
Mahsa Alimardani, researcher
The disruption threw lives and commerce into chaos. Some 62 million of Iran’s 82 million people use the internet on their mobile devices, according to official statistics. The extensive 23 November report in Mardom Salari described “bewildering” damage to commerce.

The shutdown resulted in a record sell-off in the Tehran Stock Exchange. It left ships unable to communicate with ports, delivery services unable to track shipments, currency exchange bureaus unable to convert money, university students unable to meet application deadlines, visa requests at embassies delayed, travel agencies unable to issue tickets, and pharmacies unable to fill prescriptions.

“Today, hours and even minutes are important in international trade,” Sayyid Razi Haj Aqamiri, a member of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, told the daily newspaper Etemad. “When we fail to provide the requirements of importers for any reason, other countries and companies will replace us.”

Ride-sharing apps and food-delivery services used by Iranians who rely increasingly on the internet were cut off.

The internet executive says the shutdown cost his young dotcom business about $4,000 in lost revenue, which is a “a big amount for a little Iranian software company”.

His company has daily operating costs of about $500 a day. Had the shutdown continued he would have been forced to lay people off. “All of our projects were stopped,” he says. “Developing software without internet is impossible actually.”

Other companies that were already struggling have decided to close up shop for good, says another figure in Iran’s IT industry.

“A colleague had a small-time start-up struggling for about four years,” he says, speaking during the shutdown. “He’s kept it going tooth and nail. He’s paying salaries of 10 people. Now the internet is down. He’s not making money. But he’s still paying the salaries.”

Azari-Jahromi promised in a statement this week that authorities would try to reimburse businesses for their losses. “Some losses are irreparable; we will try to compensate for them as much as possible,” he was quoted as saying by Iranian media.

As tempting as it might be for Iranian authorities, completely cutting off Iranians from the internet would be difficult, in large part because the economy is so reliant on web applications and tools that are international – like blockchain, which is used for banking transactions.

“They cannot entirely close off Iranians to the international internet,” says Alimardani. “That would mean the Iranian economy and industry would need to function in isolation from the rest of the world.”

Friday, 1 November 2019

NTT Docomo to discontinue decades-old i-mode, world's first mobile internet service, in 2026

NTT Docomo Inc. said Tuesday it will discontinue i-mode, an internet-capable mobile phone system introduced in 1999, at the end of March 2026 due to a dwindling number of users.
As the world’s first mobile internet service at the time of launch, i-mode allowed cell phone users to send emails, browse the web, make payments and shop on specially-formatted websites.
It quickly became popular in Japan, providing access to a wide variety of services, including news, weather forecasts and ticket reservations, while making picture characters known as emoji a popular element of texting.

“Given the decline in the number of contracts and the allocation of more corporate resources to 5G, we have decided to end (i-mode) services,” NTT Docomo announced in a statement.
Since the service started in February 1999, domestic subscribers to i-mode topped 40 million in 2003 and peaked at 49 million in July 2010.
NTT Docomo aimed to export the technology overseas, but only managed a limited introduction in parts of Europe, partly because there were not many i-mode capable handsets available from major manufacturers, and the service was based on a closed system, which required content providers to follow the Japanese carrier’s rules strictly.
As Apple Inc.’s iPhone and other smartphones using Google LLC’s Android operating system quickly gained popularity, i-mode subscribers continued to decline, totaling 7.63 million as of the end of September this year, including contracts for devices installed on vending machines.
(Source: JT)

Wednesday, 27 March 2019

Mobile data: Why India has the world's cheapest

India's plummeting data prices have hit a new low. In fact, according to a recent BBC report, the country has the cheapest mobile broadband prices in the world. Technology writer Prasanto K Roy explains how this happened. Read on: 

The BBC report, citing a UK-based price comparison site, said that 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data cost $0.26 in India (£0.20), compared with $12.37 in the US, $6.66 in the UK, and a global average of $8.53.

But many Indian users said they were actually paying less than $0.10 a GB. Customers in the US and UK too said they were paying less than what the survey reported.

Whatever the true cost, what is clear is that mobile data in India is many times cheaper than elsewhere. But it might not last: some said India's low prices were a transient phase as big operators fought for new customers.


Sourav Sen, a consultant with an investment firm in London, said he pays the price of three to four cups of coffee a month, or $13, for his mobile service. That gives unlimited UK voice and texts, with EU roaming for voice and up to 3GB of data. He doesn't need more, because of free WiFi everywhere. The UK has some cheaper plans, but ubiquitous free WiFi makes real comparisons with Asia difficult.

Mr Sen also points out that when he is visiting India, he is offered data at almost $6.62 per megabyte (MB), which is a staggering $6,779 per GB - and about 70,000 times more than what locals pay for data.

Far away in Gurgaon, a suburb of capital Delhi, Ramnath Mandal, employed as a driver, pays less than $3 a month for unlimited free calls. With that he gets 42GB of 4G data, at 1.5GB a day, which he uses for viewing videos and for WhatsApp calls to his family and friends in the state of Bihar. That's less than 6 cents per GB - 70 times cheaper than what Mr Sen pays for his 4G data in London.

Mr Mandal's service provider is Reliance Jio, a young telecom operator that has shaken up the Indian market with cheap, high-speed mobile data and free calls. Jio launched in September 2016 with an aggressive free trial offer, picking up 100 million customers in just six months. The 4G-only high-speed data uses spectrum suited to data, for voice as well as data.


In just two years, Jio has become the third largest telecom operator in India, with 280 million subscribers by December 2018. It gives away its 4G feature phone (which is not a smartphone), JioPhone, against a refundable security deposit of $21, with plans starting below $1 a month. The handset runs two of India's most popular apps, WhatsApp and Facebook, and supports WiFi.

India had more than 500m mobile broadband subscriptions at the end of December 2018, according to India's telecom regulator TRAI, but just 18m wired broadband subscriptions. Of the 1.17bn mobile subscriptions in the country, 55% of them are in urban areas. The big jump in broadband usage, all of it on mobiles, came mostly from Jio.

The country's older telecom operators had to compete with Jio, slashing 4G data prices and throwing in freebies. Kalipada Sasmal, another driver in Delhi, considered moving to Jio, but his operator Airtel offered him a plan under $6 a month for 40GB of data, with unused data rolled over to the next month, and free Amazon Prime video service for a year. He decided to stay with Airtel.

Clearly, Jio has driven data prices down sharply in India. Can the market sustain these prices? Industry analysts say Jio is subsidising its service to get customers - and squeeze out competitors. There were 10 telecom operators when Jio launched: now there are just four.

'Data prices will go up'
Low tariffs are purely the result of hyper-competition resulting in a huge "consumer surplus" - when consumers pay prices much lower than what they are willing to pay - according to Rajan Mathews, head of the Cellular Operators Association of India.

"These low prices are not sustainable if operators have to continue to make investments in network coverage, quality and new technology," Mr Mathews says. "Return on capital is in the low single digits for this industry. Operators will need to review their pricing, to correct this situation."

Translation: prices will go up.

Mukesh Ambani's Jio has disrupted India's telecom industry. Getty Images
Mukesh Ambani, chairman of Reliance Industries, however, has said that Jio's network has plenty of room for growth, with only a fifth of its capacity utilized. "We can multiply our customer base without additional investment," he said, speaking at the company's annual general meeting last July, when Jio had 215 million customers.

But data rates will go up, because this "hyper-competitive state of Indian telecom" is not sustainable, argues digital rights activist Nikhil Pahwa, whose portal MediaNama tracks India's digital economy.

Telecom operator margins are now wafer thin and news reports of profits shrinking to near zero at telecom companies which are feeling the pressure from Jio are common.

"Before Jio's launch, there was virtually a cartel in operation that kept prices high," Mr Pahwa says. "The lowering of rates has led to consolidation, and we are down to four operators. It's a matter of time before rates go up. This was an industry used to 30% margins, and it will want to get back there."


A source close to Jio, who does not wish to be named, says its pricing is not subsidised, but is commercially viable.

"Their disruption came from new tech," he says. "Jio bet on a frequency which was lying unused in abundance. It combined voice and data - no one had thought of using voice in that spectrum band."

And although nearly 100 million users were drawn in by Jio's prolonged free trial offer, Jio's customers are now spending more than other operators' customers. Jio reports 30% higher than average revenue per user of almost $2.

And so the drivers, cooks, migrants, students, and many blue and white-collar workers watching and sharing videos have driven up India's average mobile data consumption 10 times in two years, to more than 10GB per user per month, roughly the same as in the USA.

They have very little access to free public WiFi, though Google and RailTel Corporation's RailWire project is has brought free, high-speed broadband over WiFi to over 400 railway stations. A pre-paid Jio connection is their mainstay, often as a second SIM card in their phone, with free voice calls, and, for now, the cheapest mobile data in the world.

Saturday, 16 March 2019

Objects of despair: Mirrors

“I was the guy who, with a viral Tumblr called Selfies at Funerals, made ‘funeral selfie’ one of the most noxious phrases of 2013.”
—Jason Feifer, The Guardian


No common object has inspired as much dread, confusion, and morbid anxiety as the mirror. Superstitions exist in practically every culture: sickroom mirrors are covered in many countries, lest they lure the soul from the ailing body, and are cloaked after a death in others to prevent the spirit from lingering. A Chinese myth once held that images in the mirror were actually demonic beings who were pretending to be our reflections, while silently plotting our deaths. When I was a child, the popular folklore held that if you stood before a darkened mirror and chanted “Bloody Mary” three times, it would conjure a witch who would, if you failed to pass her tests, murder you. I never took the dare, but the story spooked me enough that I spent years avoiding my image in darkened mirrors, afraid that merely thinking the incantation could invoke her. Narcissus was the first to die from looking at his reflection—though the gnostics perfected the myth by reattributing it to Adam, who lost his divine nature, they said, by gazing at himself in a pool of water. I have always preferred this version of the Fall. The mirror, after all, is an apt metaphor—far more so than the apple—for what the Genesis story is meant to dramatize: the moment when humans evolved to self-awareness and understood, for the first time, that they would die. This primal epiphany persists in the dual meanings of “vanity,” which lock self-love and futility in an etymological death-brace. (That hevel, the Hebrew word for vanity preferred by Solomon, can also be translated as “mere breath,” only underscores the morbid undertones.)

Anthropologists have long suspected that reflections inspired the first conception of the soul: early man saw his face in a pond and believed it was an alternate self who would persist after his death. But if having a double gave you immortality, it also presented a new anxiety: your likeness could detach itself and take on a life of its own, or fall into the hands of your enemy. Many primitive taboos about reflections, shadows, and effigies stem from the conviction that you could harm a person by damaging their likeness. Witchcraft and voodoo introduced into our collective memory a nagging fear that we might one day become the slave to our shadows. I think of the scene in the 1944 musical Cover Girl, where Gene Kelly’s reflection in a store window comes to life and entrances Kelly into aping his erratic dance, as if puppeteering his marionette. The same choreography can be found in the countless Romantic-era fables where the hero trades his image to the devil for the love of a woman or the promise of eternal youth. The bargain never ends well. The reflection, once brought to life, acts out all of the hero’s repressed desires—an id made flesh—and ruins his reputation, inevitably driving him to suicide. As the psychoanalyst Otto Rank pointed out in his study of doubles, all these stories contain a moral: no matter how miraculous a reflection may seem, it is always a harbinger of death.

ROLF ARMSTRONG

Another problem with mirrors is their similarity to windows. Both are crafted in simple shapes—circles, rectangles—contained by a frame. Both give the impression of depth, inviting us to conflate their uses. The Aztec divinity Tezcatlipoca was said to possess an obsidian mirror that allowed him to “see into the hearts of men.” It was possibly one such Aztec mirror, brought back to Europe during the Renaissance, that fell into the hands of John Dee, an English occult philosopher who popularized the art of scrying—the use of mirrors or other reflective surfaces to see distant events and predict the future. (Modern witches still do their divining in black mirrors, which are sold on Etsy and in the booths of new age expos.) Today, we still fear that people are watching us through mirrors, thanks to their popularity as surveillance devices. The one-way mirror of interrogation rooms—a window disguised as a mirror—makes it impossible for the suspect to know whether or not he’s being observed. The convex mirror looming above drugstore aisles allows our every movement to be covertly monitored by the cashier. The child’s belief in parental omniscience is seemingly confirmed by the car’s rearview mirror, which makes real the mythical “eyes in the back of the head.”

What we see in a mirror is always an illusion. Lacan demonstrated that our identification with our reflection relies on méconnaissance, or misrecognition. When we look in the mirror, we see a pleasing image of wholeness and project onto it a mental fantasy—the ego ideal. If you watch someone gaze at themselves in a mirror, you can glimpse this fantasy in action. Some people suck in their lips. Others elongate their neck, or tilt their head into a more flattering light. I am as curious as anyone about the nature of people’s souls, but I can hardly bear to see the naked longing concealed in these gestures. Dickens captures it memorably in Nicholas Nickleby when a servant observes Miss Squeers gazing at herself in a mirror. “Like most of us,” the servant notes, “she saw not herself, but the reflection of some pleasant image in her own brain.”

Until recently, one did not find this look in photographs. Unlike the mirror, which flips our image horizontally (an illusion we’ve come to prefer), photos show us how we appear to others. Perhaps for this reason, the expressions we assumed for cameras have traditionally been closer to the affable, unselfconscious face we showed to the world. This has changed, owing to the invention of the smartphone and the new form it has spawned—the selfie—which allows us to watch ourselves as our image is captured. To scroll through the feeds of Instagram and Facebook is to see a gallery of Lacanian méconnaissance; the private longing once reserved for the bathroom mirror has become our most public face. And yet these photos are never as pleasing as we’d like them to be. The forward-facing camera mimics the reverse image we recognize from mirrors, but once the photo is taken, the technology flips the image as it would in a traditional photo. As a result, the still images always strike us as slightly askew: our eyes uneven, our parts reversed, our faces bulging on one side. The popularity of the mirror selfie — the selfie taken in a mirror — speaks of our desperate need to preserve the delusional image, the ideal I that exists in our heads.

Cultural critics of every generation have decried the narcissism of their age, but never before has a single object—the phone—been made to bear the entire weight of our descent into solipsism. Perhaps this stems from the irony that these devices were originally intended for connection and communication. The turn inward suggests the closing of some imaginative possibility: a window becoming a mirror. But these think pieces themselves exhibit a lack of imagination, reiterating the same points about skin-smoothing apps and body dysmorphia, rapturously quoting Chrissy Teigen, who once offhandedly called Snapchat “a narcissism dream machine.” Such commentary rarely breaches the true ontological disruption and psychic doubling that makes these devices so unsettling. One can only imagine the critical field day Freud or Jung would have with the face-swap filter, which allows you to, quite literally, project your ego onto another person. Few have pointed out that such apps depend upon “computer vision,” affirming the ancient fear that we are being seen by something sentient that lives on the other side of the screen, like the Slave of the Mirror who is trapped in the evil queen’s looking glass in Snow White. Can we ignore the fact that the screens of these devices, when idle, blink to the reflective obsidian of a black mirror? I once stumbled into an occultist subreddit where people were earnestly discussing whether iPhones and tablets could be used as scrying mirrors (the consensus: yes, but it’s easy to get distracted). One of the users then shared a stoner revelation that these technologies were already divination machines: they give us access to an esoteric font of knowledge and allow us to remotely view other people and places.

But revelations of this sort only expose our ongoing credulity, the extent to which we still believe ourselves to be the scryers and not the scryed. We are rarely on the transparent side of the one-way mirror: it is our images that appear on the devices at Langley and Fort Meade and the trailers of Russian troll farms. The temporal schema of Snapchat, where images erase themselves after viewing, was inspired by our anxiety about doubles. The disappearance was supposed to forestall the proliferation of shadow selves that could slip out of our control and be used for malignant purposes. Deepfake videos and apps like Mug Life are black magic performed as blackmail, allowing hackers and jilted exes to make our reflections say and do things we have neither said nor done. Most of these stolen images are eventually found in sexual postures—or what Google now calls “involuntary synthetic pornographic images”—and its victims are not unlike the Romantic hero who finds that his double has sabotaged his good name. (“All I could think of was my character,” one deepfake victim told the Washington Post. “Is this what people will think of me?”)

The internet is one endless hall of mirrors where the line between our selves and our shadow souls is blurred. We guard against it with the flimsiest of talismans—Twitter’s blue checkmark, handles that insist upon “The_Real.” The most horrific moment in mirror fables comes when the hero realizes that his reflection is indestructible: to kill his double would amount to suicide. Now we have created a place where death is virtually impossible, where we are denied even the simple dignity of what the EU calls “the right to be forgotten.” (How many bloggers have deleted their archive only to find that it has been replicated in its entirety on a mirror site?) This is not to say that we are not complicit. All of us have entered willingly into this bargain with the devil, who knows better than anyone that our weak spot is vanity. Our online reflections—the idealized images that appear in Google image results—are largely the objects of our own creation, more real to us than our fragmented bodies. We have become the pale custodians of these digital eidolons, the marionettes of our shadows.

Freud believed that doubles were a sign of psychic disintegration—a theory that has since been mythologized by midcentury auteurs, who dramatized a character’s free fall into madness through the appearance of a doppelgänger (Bergman’s Persona, Altman’s 3 Women, Hitchcock’s Vertigo). Unlike the primary narcissism that occurs in children, which is a source of power and delight, the adult narcissist finds her double uncanny and comes to believe she is being persecuted by it. This is the problem with megalomaniacs: they see themselves everywhere and believe all events are related to them. We have no shortage of scapegoats for our own paranoia: Twitter mobs, the NSA, malware. But the unease we experience in the digital maze recalls the deeper, more primal logic of horror stories and our most unsettling nightmares. There is a moment when you’re forced to acknowledge that the voice on the other end of the line is eerily familiar. You flee down a corridor, only to turn the corner and come face to face with yourself.

What we are outrunning, of course, is our final end—our knowledge that Death owns a doll bearing each of our faces. That we now have a modern version of the Narcissus myth—“death by selfie,” people who have died in the midst of posing with sharks and on the edge of cliffs—speaks of some half-remembered truth that has already begun its descent into the collective unconscious. A more telling object is perhaps the funeral selfie. The collective outrage inspired by the news, several years ago, that many people take and post self-portraits during funerals is evidence itself that we’ve forgotten such myths. The phenomenon could not have surprised anyone fluent in psychoanalysis, which has long known that narcissism springs from that primal sublimation—our inability to countenance our own mortality.

There are those who promise eternal life to those who post prolifically; our reflections, they say, are a form of digital DNA that will be used to resurrect us in some distant future. But I have never been able to buy into this vision. It’s more likely that these images are all that will be left of our souls. I sometimes imagine the Great Internet Archive as the afterlife painted by Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes: a dusky underworld where our shades will persist in the preening poses we assumed during our waking lives, making duck face, among the echoes of our likes and shares, our witticisms and cheap jokes—all our wasted breath.

(Source: The Paris Review)

Friday, 8 June 2018

Are literary classics behind the misogyny of the incel movement?

Incels aren’t monsters of cruel internet culture – they are the product of the American literary canon that has long glorified male sexual frustration, writes Erin Spampinato in the Guardian. Read on: 

One month ago, Alek Minassian drove through a Toronto shopping district in a rented van, killing 10 people and injuring 16 more. Analysis of Minassian’s online activity – where he participated in forums for the involuntarily celibate, or incels – quickly revealed the attack’s motivation: he was avenging himself on the women (apparently all of us) who had rejected him. He declared that with his act of terrorism, the “incel rebellion” had begun – although he was not the first self-described incel to use his sexlessness as an excuse for acts of mass violence.

Though the subsequent rash of media analysis might lead you to think otherwise, none of this is new – not even the term “incel”, which was first coined in 1993 by a queer Canadian woman when she created a website for people who identified as involuntary celibates to share their thoughts and feelings. The incel community that exists today on reddit, 4chan and incel.me is an inchoate and ever-evolving group, which seems to change shape with every attempt to characterize it. The genealogy of today’s incel grows more complex the more you dig (he is descended from both the aggressively misogynist pick-up artist community and the slightly more sympathetic “love-shy” community). What members of all these groups share, of course, is their sense of their own alienation from women and their (almost always deeply misogynistic) conviction that this alienation has negatively affected their lives in myriad profound ways.

The sentiments offered by participants in such forums range from standard misogynist cliche, to violent hatred for women, to deep ambivalence and confusion about all aspects of human sexuality. At best, these communities are desperately sad and at worst – and lately we’ve been seeing them at their worst – incel and related forums rationalize and even celebrate the rape and murder of women, and advocate state-mandated “sexual redistribution of women” (the rationale behind which, amazingly, has been echoed by several prominent rightwing thinkers lately).

"The plots of a number of other ‘classic’ novels, from Great Expectations and A Tale of Two Cities to The Great Gatsby, are driven by a (white) male character’s frustrated desire with a remote woman."

I am writing this on 23 May, the fourth anniversary of Elliot Rodger’s Isla Vista spree killing, a set of murders explicitly motivated by the perpetrator’s extreme hatred of women and the men he perceived as more sexually successful than he. As of the time of writing, 10.09am, there are multiple posts on the front page of incel.me celebrating Rodger as a hero (many more will surely show up throughout the day). Posters are discussing what kind of vanilla latte Rodger would have liked (hot or cold), congratulating each other on the anniversary (which they’re calling “The Supreme Gentleman’s Day” and “The Day of Retribution”), and making playlists of his favorite songs (they call these 80s pop songs “Elliotcore”). Where did these young men get the idea that male pathos (stereotypically defined by them as sexual frustration) is so pathetic, so worthy of tribute? One possible answer to the question, one we don’t discuss very much, is our culture’s literary history. The incel isn’t just a monstrous birth of our casually cruel and anonymous internet culture. He is also a product of anglo-American literary culture, which (particularly in the 20th century) treats the topic of male sexual frustration as if it is of prime importance to us all.

Think of the literature you read in high school. One source of Hamlet’s insanity, those around him find it natural to assume, is his sexual frustration with Ophelia. Multiple characters in the play scheme to bring the two together, hoping that if she puts out he’ll calm the fuck down and not kill everyone. The plots of a number of other “classic” novels, from Great Expectations and A Tale of Two Cities to The Great Gatsby, are driven by a (white) male character’s frustrated desire with a remote woman. Holden Caulfield’s ramble through New York is punctuated by his obsessive recollections of Jane Gallagher, the girl he respected too much to try to fuck. Tim O’Brien’s collection, The Things They Carried, lingers on the story of Jimmy Cross and his obsession with a woman named Martha, whom he knew before he was drafted. Cross is depicted as a genuine figure of pathos: a normal, relatable man caught in a terrible position who uses fantasy as a way to manage the horrors of his war experience. He remembers touching Martha’s knee one night, and how she had recoiled. As he recalls this scene, he fantasizes about having “done something brave”. “He should’ve,” he thinks, “carried her up the stairs to her room and tied her to the bed and touched that left knee all night long.” That his fascination with her takes the form of a rape fantasy is later revealed to be doubly significant. It is not just evidence of his resentment towards her for rejecting him, but also, we later learn, proof that he has somehow intuited the history of sexual trauma that lives behind her veneer of disassociation, her eyes which are always “wide open, not afraid, not a virgin’s eyes, just flat and uninvolved”.

Perhaps these novels coached me into taking male sexual frustration seriously through a kind of frightful education: look what happens, they seemed to say, when men don’t get what they want.

I choose The Things They Carried to pick on here because it’s a favorite of mine. I think it’s brilliant, but it offers a prime example of the way our literary culture has long treated rage and aggression as if they are normal features of (white) male sexuality. (The racial component is of course significant here, since the exact opposite has long been true for depictions of black male sexuality, which have been represented as essentially and problematically aggressive.) The literature we choose to teach our children evidences how untroubled we are by this disturbing cliche that rage and a fascination with violation are characteristic features of (again, white) male sexuality. This is of course one of the main points of O’Brien’s beautiful book, but it doesn’t change the fact that as a teenager I had read many fictional accounts of men’s rape fantasies long before I had ever read a literary account from the woman’s perspective of rape, or even of consensual sex. I was trained to accept that male sexual frustration was a serious issue because I read hundreds of pages about it before the age of 20, far more than I read about issues of undoubtedly greater social import, like the legacy of slavery, the alienation of women and people of color from public life, or the violence of the settler colonialism on which the United States was founded. Perhaps these novels even coached me into taking male sexual frustration seriously through a kind of frightful education: look what happens, they seemed to say, when men don’t get what they want.

‘Our literary culture has long treated rage and aggression as if they are normal features of (white) male sexuality.’
And these are just the books I read in high school. Don’t even get me started on DH Lawrence, W Somerset Maugham, Ernest Hemingway, Harold Pinter, Henry Miller, Saul Bellow, Vladimir Nabokov, John Updike, Norman Mailer, Bret Easton Ellis, or the patron saint of elevating male bullshit: David Foster Wallace. (Don’t @ me; I don’t care.) Though many of these authors are justly celebrated, they have all repeatedly treated male sexual frustration as if it deserves pride of place among the great issues of Life. Lolita even succeeds in conjuring sympathy for the desires of a pedophile. (Gregor von Rezzori famously called it “the only convincing love story of our century” in Vanity Fair, a quotation which has long been emblazoned on the cover of the Vintage edition of the novel.) By contrast, novels of women’s frustration with society – not sex – like those of Edith Wharton and Kate Chopin, are classed as special interest pieces: feminist fiction or women’s fiction, not Great American Novels.

This all becomes even more ironic when we consider the history – not literary, but real – of identifying women’s sexual frustration as the psychological problem of hysteria. For hundreds of years, women were literally committed because of a “disease” that male doctors attributed to a handful of sexual causes: women with hysteria were either not getting fucked enough, had been fucked by the wrong people, had wanted to fuck the wrong people, or had just plain wanted to fuck too much. It’s hardly an insight to say that men have been telling women about how they should behave sexually forever, and that usually their instructions are geared to benefit their own pleasure or politics. That today’s most visible forms of misogyny, however, reverse the traditional rationale about female sexuality – it’s not that we need to get fucked more for our own good, but for the good of a nation plagued by mass shootings perpetrated by lonely men – just goes to show that this kind of misogyny cuts across political and ideological categories. I think our most celebrated and most taught literature also shows that. After revisiting the books that I was first introduced to as “great novels”, I see that many of them rehearse and even promote the idea that male sexual suffering (often represented by deprivation) is a public concern, while female sexual suffering (often represented by trauma) is a private, psychological issue. In literature, time and again, men – both writers and characters – elevate their pathos by revealing it. By contrast, female pathos marks a text as niche, as “confessional”, as minor.

This is more extreme version of a broader phenomenon described by Rebecca Solnit (among others): “A book without women is often said to be about humanity but a book with women in the foreground is a woman’s book.” This is the same logic that allows us to unreflectively give teenagers The Catcher in the Rye instead of The Bell Jar, because JD Salinger’s book seems to have universal appeal, while Sylvia Plath’s is an account of pathology (when in reality, of course, both books tackle the protagonist’s mental illness). It is the same logic that meant I wasn’t exposed to the novels of Alice Walker, Margaret Atwood, Marilynne Robinson or Toni Morrison until college. It is the same logic that recently allowed Gay Talese to argue publicly that he had not been influenced by any female writers (as if that’s possible). In short, literary culture has long been complicit in upholding the structures by which we imagine men to be more worthy of attention and thus more human.

In both life and literature, we lock up women who are dangerously sexually frustrated for the (supposed) good of themselves and the good of the community, but we ask the community to adapt to and accommodate male sexual suffering. We regularly ask teenage girls to read books in which characters degrade women, expecting them to understand that the book’s other merits outweigh its misogyny. To set such an expectation and not consider its effect on young women is foolish and hypocritical; we rarely expect young men to do the same, and hardy ever expect young white men to read extensively in traditions where their identities aren’t represented or are degraded. We need to reflect on the way the literature we celebrate supports the idea that women who are sexually frustrated create problems for themselves, while men in the same situation create problems for the world. Though the links are subtle, our celebration of a canon of sad white boy literature affects the way we think, and how much tolerance we offer to men like Minassian and Rodger.

It’s time to be done with this particular story, which treats white male rage as a ceaseless source of interest.

We have been told recently that there is a crisis in masculinity in America, and that we should be worried about it. We have been subjected to ideologues using this “crisis” as impetus to consider radically regressive ideas about sexuality. We can counteract this fearmongering by remembering the misogyny of the canon, which reveals to us that we have always worried about male sexual frustration more than we need to (or at least, more than we worry about more widely devastating social issues). We have always treated the alienation of men as if it deserved thousands of pages of analysis, perhaps because we feared it had the power to endanger us all. (Because, as Margaret Atwood famously put it: “Men worry that women will laugh at them, and women worry that men will kill them.”) Reassessing the canon allows us to see that one of the reasons why “he was a lonely virgin” sounds like reasonable justification to us for a spree killing is that we have long valorized male isolation. Our literary canon treats such desire as if it is a (if not the) central topic in the lives of white men. It treats the frustration of male desire as if it merits exploration time and again. Maybe people like Jordan Peterson and Ross Douthat (two mainstream writers who have recently entertained the possibility that society would benefit from “sex redistribution”) wouldn’t think male isolation was a privileged social problem (rather than an individual psychological problem) if our literary culture didn’t also support that idea. Maybe Donald Trump wouldn’t have won the presidency in a country that didn’t worry so much about what white men think all the time.

I’m not saying that we need to divest entirely from the mid-century authors like Pinter, Bellow, Updike and Roth who have so shaped American literary culture (though I’d personally be cool with letting Hemingway, Ellis and Wallace drift into obscurity). But I do think it’s time to be done with this particular story, which treats white male rage as a ceaseless source of interest. Perhaps we already are done with this story, and instead of representing a generation-wide crisis in masculinity, the incels are just the dudes who haven’t gotten over the fact that we’ve gotten over them. In that case, we might view their terrorism (or even the affront to civil rights represented by Trump’s win) not as the beginning of an uprising but as the last gasps of a defeated army.

I’m not naive enough to think that we will ever read or write misogyny out of existence, but I hope that more of us (especially men) will start reading more widely, start balancing books like American Psycho with books like Chris Kraus’s equally nimble satire of American life, I Love Dick. If I am right that there are subtle but real connections between mainstream literary structural misogyny and violent subcultures like that of the incel, then perhaps our lives actually depend on it.

Sunday, 31 December 2017

The internet is still actually controlled by 14 people who hold 7 secret keys

It sounds like something out of a Dan Brown book, but it isn't: The whole internet is protected by seven highly protected keys in the hands of 14 people.

They hold a historic ritual known as the Root Signing Ceremony.

Recently,  the world got a good reminder about the importance of the organisation these people belong to.

A good chunk of the internet went down for a while when hackers managed to throw so much traffic at a company called Dyn that Dyn's servers couldn't take it.

Dyn is a major provider of something called a domain name system, which translates web addresses such as businessinsider.com into the numerical IP addresses that computers use to identify web pages.

Dyn is just one DNS provider. And while hackers never gained control of its network, successfully taking it offline for even just a few hours via a distributed denial of service attack shows how much the internet relies on DNS. This attack briefly brought down sites like Business Insider, Amazon, Twitter, Github, Spotify, and many others.
Participants in the August 2016 ICANN key ceremony. ICANN
If you control all of DNS, you can control all of the internet
DNS at its highest levels is secured by a handful of people around the world, known crypto officers.

Every three months since 2010, some — but typically not all — of these people gather to conduct a highly secure ritual known as a key ceremony, where the keys to the internet's metaphorical master lock are verified and updated.

The people conducting the ceremony are part of an organisation called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. ICANN is responsible for assigning numerical internet addresses to websites and computers.

If someone were to gain control of ICANN's database, that person would pretty much control the internet. For instance, the person could send people to fake bank websites instead of real bank websites.

To protect DNS, ICANN came up with a way of securing it without entrusting too much control to any one person. It selected seven people as key holders and gave each one an actual key to the internet. It selected seven more people as backup key holders — 14 people in all. The ceremony requires at least three of them, and their keys, attend, because three keys are needed to unlock the equipment that protects DNS. The Guardian's James Ball wrote a great story about them in 2014.

A highly scripted ritual
The physical keys unlock safe deposit boxes. Inside those boxes are smart key cards. It takes multiple keys to gain access to the device that generates the internet's master key.

That master key is really some computer code known as a root key-signing key. It is a password of sorts that can access the master ICANN database. This key generates more keys that trickle down to protect various bits and pieces of the internet, in various places, used by different internet security organisations.

The security surrounding the ceremonies before and after is intense. It involves participants passing through a series of locked doors using key codes and hand scanners until they enter a room so secure that no electronic communications can escape it. Inside the room, the crypto officers assemble along with other ICANN officials and typically some guests and observers.

The whole event is heavily scripted, meticulously recorded, and audited. The exact steps of the ceremony are mapped out in advance and distributed to the participants so that if any deviation occurs the whole room will know.

The group conducts the ceremony, as scripted, then each person files out of the room one by one. They've been known to go to a local restaurant and celebrate after that.

But as secure as all of this is, the internet is an open piece of technology not owned by any single entity. The internet was invented in the US, but the US relinquished its decades of stewardship of DNS earlier this month. ICANN is officially in charge.

Keenly aware of its international role and the worldwide trust placed on it, ICANN lets anyone monitor this ceremony, providing a live stream over the internet. It also publishes the scripts for each ceremony.


On October 27, ICANN will hold another ceremony – and this one will be historic, too. For the first time, it will change out the master key itself. Technically speaking, it will change the "key pair" upon which all DNS security is built, known as the Root Zone Signing Key.

"If you had this key and were able to, for example, generate your own version of the root zone, you would be in the position to redirect a tremendous amount of traffic," Matt Larson, vice president of research at ICANN, recently told Motherboard's Joseph Cox.

(Source: BI UK)

Saturday, 7 October 2017

The future of the web is 100 years old

In the debate between structure and openness, 19th-century ideas are making a comeback, writes Alex Wright, the author of Cataloging the World: Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age, on Nautilus. Read on: 

The Earth may not be flat, but the web certainly is.

“There is no ‘top’ to the World-Wide Web,” declared a 1992 foundational document from the World Wide Web Consortium—meaning that there is no central server or organizational authority to determine what does or does not get published. It is, like Borges’ famous Library of Babel, theoretically infinite, stitched together with hyperlinks rather than top-down, Dewey Decimal-style categories.1 It is also famously open—built atop a set of publicly available industry standards.

While these features have connected untold millions and created new forms of social organization, they also come at a cost. Material seems to vanish almost as quickly as it is created, disappearing amid broken links or into the constant flow of the social media “stream.” It can be hard to distinguish fact from falsehood. Corporations have stepped into this confusion, organizing our browsing and data in decidedly closed, non-transparent ways. Did it really have to turn out this way?

The web has played such a powerful role in shaping our world that it can sometimes seem like a fait accompli—the inevitable result of progress and enlightened thinking. A deeper look into the historical record, though, reveals a different story: The web in its current state was by no means inevitable. Not only were there competing visions for how a global knowledge network might work, divided along cultural and philosophical lines, but some of those discarded hypotheses are coming back into focus as researchers start to envision the possibilities of a more structured, less volatile web.

By the late 19th century, the modern information age had already begun. The industrialization of the printing press, coupled with the introduction of cheap rag paper, had dramatically altered the economics of publishing. Much of Europe and North America was awash in data. Daily newspapers, cheap magazines, and mass-market novels all emerged during this period, along with a flurry of institutional reports, memos, and all kinds of other printed ephemera.

Meanwhile, new communications technologies like the telegraph and telephone were cropping up. Tram and railway lines were proliferating. An increasingly internationalized postal service sped the flow of data around the globe. By 1900, a global information network had already started to take shape.

The industrial information explosion triggered waves of concern about how to manage all that data. Accomplished librarians like Melvil Dewey (of Decimal System fame), Sir Anthony Panizzi of the British Library, and Charles Cutter of the Boston Athenaeum all began devising new systems to cope with the complexity of their burgeoning collections. In the fast-growing corporate world, company archivists started to develop complex filing systems to accommodate the sudden deluge of typewritten documents.

The dream of organizing the world’s information stemmed not from an authoritarian impulse, but from a deeply utopian one.

Among these efforts, one stood out. In 1893, a young Belgian lawyer named Paul Otlet wrote an essay expressing his concern over the rapid proliferation of books, pamphlets, and periodicals. The problem, he argued, should be “alarming to those who are concerned about quality rather than quantity,” and he worried about how anyone would ever make sense of it all. An ardent bibliophile with an entrepreneurial streak, he began working on a solution with his partner, a fellow lawyer named Henri La Fontaine (who would later go on to join the Belgian Senate and win the Nobel Peace Prize): a “Universal Bibliography” (Repertoire bibliographique universel) that would catalog all the world’s published information and make it freely accessible.

The project won Otlet and La Fontaine a Grand Prize at the Paris World Expo of 1900, and attracted funding from the Belgian government. It would eventually encompass more than 16 million entries ranging from books and periodicals to newspapers, photographs, posters, and audio and video recordings, all painstakingly recorded on individual index cards. Otlet even established an international network of associations and a vast museum called the World Palace (Palais Mondial) or Mundaneum, which at one point occupied more than 100 rooms in a government building.

Otlet’s Mundaneum presented an alternative vision to today’s (nominally) flat and open web by relying on a high degree of bibliographical control. He envisioned a group of trained indexers managing the flow of information in and out of the system, making sure that every incoming piece of data would be properly categorized and synthesized into a coherent body of knowledge. To this end, he and La Fontaine developed a sophisticated cataloging system that they dubbed the Universal Decimal Classification. Using the Dewey Decimal System as its starting point, it started with a few top-level domains (like Philosophy, Social Sciences, and The Arts), which could then be further divided into a theoretically infinite number of sub-topics. This in itself was nothing new, but Otlet introduced an important new twist: a set of so-called “auxiliary tables” that allowed indexers to connect one topic to another by using a combination of numeric codes and familiar marks like the equal sign, plus sign, colon, and quotation marks. So, for example, the code 339.5 (410/44) denoted “Trade relations between the United Kingdom and France,” while 311:[622+669](485) meant “Statistics of mining and metallurgy in Sweden.”

Otlet hoped that this new system would allow for a grand unification of human knowledge, and entirely new forms of information. But neither he nor his Mundaneum survived the ravages of World War II. After invading Brussels, the Nazis destroyed much of his life’s work, removing more than 70 tons worth of material and repurposing the World Palace site for an exhibition of Third Reich art. Otlet died in 1944, and has remained largely forgotten ever since.

Otlet was not alone in his grand vision for a carefully cataloged global network. The English novelist H.G. Wells—a devout socialist, pacifist, and feminist (not to mention ardent promoter of free love)—wrote a series of popular essays that he eventually published in 1938 under the title World Brain.

With Europe standing on the brink of war, he called for a new, deeply ontological approach to managing conflict. “All the distresses and horrors of the present time are fundamentally intellectual,” he wrote. “The world has to pull its mind together.”2 Like Otlet, he saw this undertaking as a central component of a grander, utopian scheme. He envisioned a vast new “encyclopedia” as the distributed brain of a new world order, in which a centralized global information agency would employ an army of technocrats (or “samurai,” as he called them) to curate, classify, and disseminate humanity’s collective knowledge store around the globe.

Other important European thinkers like the German chemist and Nobel laureate Wilhelm Ostwald—who envisioned an Otlet-like universal knowledge repository called “The Bridge” (Die Brücke)—and his protégé Emanuel Goldberg—who invented an early microfilm indexing tool—also explored the possibilities of new, index-driven methods for organizing and distributing the world’s information.

All of these proposals were, first and foremost, managed systems, closely curated collections of knowledge that would have required a high degree of systematic control. And for the most part, they were situated squarely in the public sector, with little role for private enterprise. They emerged in an era of industrialization, when many writers saw great hope in the possibilities of scientific management to improve the human condition; and in a time of war, when many thinkers hoped that a more orderly system would serve as a bulwark against the possibility of international conflict.

In other words, the dream of organizing the world’s information stemmed not from an authoritarian impulse, but from a deeply utopian one. In the United States, though, a very different kind of utopia was being imagined.

ALL THE WORLD’S INFORMATION: An unpublished drawing by Paul Otlet
from the Encyclopaedia Universalis Mundaneum papers details part of
his organization system (1930s).
Across the Atlantic, an alternative vision of computing was taking shape, driven by a deeply humanistic, individualistic, and American impulse. That vision found its earliest expression in an essay published by Vannevar Bush, a prolific inventor and sometime advisor to President Roosevelt during WWII. In “As We May Think,” first published in The Atlantic in 1945, Bush proposed a purely hypothetical machine called the Memex: a kind of souped-up microfilm reader that has since become one of the platonic objects of the networked age. The Memex would allow its user to search across a large body of documents stored on film, then create associations—“links”—between them.

Like Otlet and the others before him, Bush recognized the urgent problem of information overload. “The investigator is staggered by the findings and conclusions of thousands of other workers,” he wrote, “conclusions which he cannot find time to grasp, much less to remember, as they appear.” Unlike Otlet, however, Bush saw no need for an army of indexers to keep track of the world’s information. He pointed out what he called “the artificiality of systems of indexing.”3

Bush argued that the human mind operates “by association,” not indexing. And so he proposed a system that would not impose any particular classification system, but would instead allow the user to create “associative trails” that would ultimately be made visible to other users. The essay proved wildly popular, especially after it was reprinted in Life magazine. That version of the essay found its way into the hands of a young Navy officer named Douglas Engelbart, then stationed in the Philippines, who found Bush’s vision so inspiring that he chose to devote much of the rest of his life to realizing it. Engelbart eventually landed a position at the Stanford Research Institute, where he attracted the attention of J.C.R. Licklider, professor at the Massachucetts Institute of Technology and then-new head of the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, later renamed DARPA).

Engelbart worked in the 1960s San Francisco Bay Area, where an anti-institutionalist counterculture was then reaching its zenith (at one point he even experimented with LSD). The culture stood in stark contrast to the orderly, institutional tendencies of Otlet and Wells. Where Europeans were turning to their institutions in a time of crisis, many Americans were growing up in a value system that emphasized individualism and personal liberation. It was in this milieu that Licklider, Engelbart, and others began laying the foundations for the web we know today.

With Licklider’s support, Engelbart began work on a proto-hypertext tool that eventually came to be known as the oN-Line System. In 1968, he gave a demonstration of the system at the Herbst Theater in San Francisco, an event that has since gone down in computer history lore as The Mother of All Demos. Engelbart presented a startlingly far-sighted concept, complete with a word processor, a method for creating hyperlinks between documents, and live video conferencing, all operated by a keyboard and a rudimentary mouse (another Engelbart invention).

Where Otlet and Wells envisioned publicly funded, trans-national organizations, we now have an oligarchy of public corporations.

The 1960s novelist and Merry Prankster Ken Kesey later dubbed the system “the next thing after acid.” By the early 1970s, a “People’s Computer Center” had appeared in Menlo Park, California, providing access to rudimentary computer tools. Personal liberation, empowerment, and revolutionary rhetoric—all deeply American traits—shaped the attitudes of many early personal computer hobbyists, and have persisted ever since in the cultural fabric of the modern technology industry.4

The utopianism of that era found a particularly colorful expression in the work of Ted Nelson, a decidedly unconventional computing entrepreneur who promoted his own alternative vision of hypertext (a word he coined in 1963). A former filmmaker turned Harvard sociology student, Nelson developed a fascination with computers in the 1960s that led him to self-publish a series of visionary, over-the-top manifestos like Computer Lib and Dream Machines. These presented startlingly original concepts, with names like “Thinkertoys,” “Indexing Vortexes,” and “Window Sandwiches,” that pointed the way toward a radically personalized form of networked computing.

In his masterwork Literary Machines, published in 1981, Nelson proposed something called Xanadu. Taking its name from Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s opium-fueled depiction of Kublai Khan’s “pleasure dome,” Xanadu was a “universal data structure to which all other data structures will be mapped,” enabling millions of users to create and share their original written and graphical material.5 Though Nelson never realized his ambitions for Xanadu, it would provide direct inspiration for Tim Berners-Lee’s eventual creation of the World Wide Web.

Like many of his kindred spirits from the 1960s, Nelson took a strong dislike to centrally managed systems. “From earliest youth I was suspicious of categories and hierarchies,” he wrote. He was suspicious, too, of large institutions, and especially the university system, which “imbues in everyone the attitude that the world is divided into ‘subjects’; that these subjects are well-defined and well-understood; and that there are ‘basics,’ that is, a hierarchy of understandings.” The explosive growth of the web that would come 30 years later would have the unmistakable stamp of Nelson’s democratic computing ideal.


Today’s web seems to exist in a state of perpetual discord. There is a constant publishing and unpublishing, amid which we sometimes seem to be teetering on the brink of mass cultural amnesia. The lack of intellectual property controls has created massive—and avoidable—disruption for authors, musicians, and other members of the creative trades (although it’s worth noting that Nelson’s Xanadu proposed solutions for intellectual property concerns). The lack of stable identity management controls has ushered in the age of spam, phishing, and all manner of malware.

As a result, most of us rely on for-profit companies to make the web safe, useful, and usable. Today, Google and a handful of other major Internet corporations like Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon fulfill much the same role that Otlet envisioned for the Mundaneum—channeling the world’s intellectual output. Google freely excludes sites from its index for reasons that it is under no obligation to disclose—the secrets of the Googlebot are Delphic mysteries known only to its inner circle of engineers. An increasing number of web users rely on keyword searching and timelines, like Facebook’s, as their primary interfaces. Where Otlet and Wells envisioned publicly funded, trans-national organizations, we now have an oligarchy of public corporations.

While the web may be flat and open in both the public imagination and in the founding rhetoric of the World Wide Web Consortium, a truly flat web may have been just as much of an unreachable utopia as Otlet’s universal bibliography. More than a century after Otlet began work on his Mundaneum, the Consortium has begun to consider a new hierarchy that is remarkably Otlet-like in spirit. In May 2001, Tim Berners-Lee, the Consortium’s director, published a paper in Scientific American, along with two co-authors, proposing a so-called “web of data,” called the Semantic Web. The Semantic Web uses metadata, marked-up descriptions of content that follow a consistent set of rules (something like a library classification scheme). By allowing for the consistent use of ontologies, or standardized definitions of topics, content types, and relationships, the Semantic Web promises to make it easier to combine data from disparate sources.6 The Semantic Web uses a data model known as the Resource Description Framework (RDF) to encode subject-predicate-object relationships—in much the same way that Otlet’s Universal Decimal Classificiation used auxiliary tables to allow for the encoding of links between topics, as the historian of science Charles van den Heuvel has pointed out.

Just as Otlet’s ideas of centralized hierarchy encountered stiff opposition in his day, so too has the Semantic Web. Some have argued that the Semantic Web amounts to a betrayal of the principles that made the web successful in the first place. In a widely circulated 2005 essay, “Ontologies are Overrated,” technology pundit Clay Shirky argued that the Semantic Web was doomed to failure. “The more you push in the direction of scale, spread, fluidity, flexibility,” he wrote, “the harder it becomes to handle the expense of starting a cataloging system and the hassle of maintaining it, to say nothing of the amount of force you have to get to exert over users to get them to drop their own world view in favor of yours.” Shirky’s solution? Crowdsourcing. “The only group that can categorize everything,” he wrote, “is everybody.”7

Web pundit David Weinberger has also given eloquent voice to the anti-hierarchical ethos of the web, arguing that we “have to get rid of the idea that there’s a best way of organizing the world.” Rather than rely on institutional controls, he believes that the web’s messiness is an inherent virtue. “Filter on the way out, not on the way in,” he writes, predicting the emergence of what he calls a “third order” of knowledge, one not constrained by the physical limitations of paper, nor encumbered by layers of institutional gatekeepers.8

Shirky and Weinberger’s critiques point toward important practical challenges that are not easily solved. The question of who might “own” the Semantic Web is a thorny problem. Protocols and standards need an administrative infrastructure to be sustained—as Otlet learned through bitter experience. But there may be a third way. A burgeoning “Linked Data movement” is exploring how to automate the classification process by having computers crawl the web and create machine-generated ontologies, rather than relying on the manual curation of experts. The army of catalogers that Otlet and Wells envisioned may never materialize, but they may not need to: An army of searchbots and algorithms may just do the job instead.

Should the web remain free, flat, and open? Or would a more controlled and curated environment lead, paradoxically, to greater intellectual freedom? These questions can only be completely understood in a historical context, as the latest installment in centuries-old debates about hierarchy and access, efficiency and freedom, institutions and the individual. While it’s easy to give in to the temptations of historical exceptionalism and view today’s web as the pinnacle of humanity’s inexorable march towards liberation, variations on this dialogue have been swirling since before the dawn of the industrial revolution. At 25 years old, the web has plenty of growing up to do.

References
1. Borges, J.L. The library of babel. https://archive.org/stream/TheLibraryOfBabel/babel_djvu.txt (1941).

2. Wells, H.G. Today’s distress and horrors basically intellectual: Wells. Science News Letter 32, 229 (1937).

3. Bush, V. As We May Think. The Atlantic Monthly 176, 641–649 (1945).

4. Markoff, J. What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped the Personal Computer Industry Penguin Books, New York, NY (2006).

5. Nelson, T.H. Literary Machines Mindful Press, Sausolito, CA (1993).

6. Berners-Lee, T., Hendler, J., & Lassila, O. The semantic web. Scientific American 284, 29-37 (2001).

7.Shirky, C. Ontology Is Overrated. http://www.shirky.com/writings/ontology_overrated.html

8. Weinberger, D. Everything Is Miscellaneous: The Power of the New Digital Disorder Times Books, New York, NY (2007).