Showing posts with label hindus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hindus. Show all posts

Wednesday, 1 June 2022

Can you take a dog to a temple? Devdutt Pattanaik on the role of dogs in Hindu mythology

 ‘Dogs, in general, are associated with the aggressive form of Shiva known as Bhairava,’ writes Devdutt Pattanaik. Read on: 

“A First Information Report (FIR) has been filed against a Noida resident who took his pet dog to the holy Kedarnath shrine.”: NDTV


The world over, dogs are seen as loyal animals associated with unconditional love. However, in Hindu mythology, their representation is ambiguous. On the one hand, they are seen as auspicious, as guardians or as the symbol of the followers of Nath traditions – tantrics and hermits. On the other hand, they are known to be inauspicious, associated with death, attachment and neediness, and a metaphor for the ego.


This metaphor stems from the fact that dogs are devoted to their masters. They follow their masters everywhere; wag their tails when they are happy and whine when their masters don’t give them adequate attention and love. Thus they become a symbol of attachment and the gratification of the ego.


They are also associated with refuse, and thus with impurity. In this respect, the dog is really located in opposition to the cow, which is seen as pure and holy. Of course, this is a very broad understanding.


Interestingly, the dog’s rise to prominence in India is not recent. Indian mythology is peppered with fascinating tales featuring dogs.


The Korkus are a tribe scattered across Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, residing mainly in the Dharnagiri region. They consider themselves descendants of Ravana and believe that Shiva created their world.

Artwork by Devdutt Pattanaik.


According to legend, once Ravana strayed into the scenic but unpopulated forests of the Vindhyachal and Satpura ranges. He prayed to Shiva to populate those forests with people. Shiva directed his messenger, the crow Kageshwar, to collect red soil from the hilly region between Bhavargadh and Savligadh (in the Betul district). Shiva then made two statues – of a man and a woman – from the soil and placed them in the forested region.


However, before he could infuse them with life, Indra got his horses to destroy the statues. Enraged, Shiva proceeded to create two dogs out of the red soil. He infused them with life and had them drive Indra’s horses away. He then remade the two human statues and bestowed life upon them. The man and the woman, named Moola and Moolai, respectively, are considered the ancestors of the Korku tribe. The Korku thus worship Shiva, Ravana and the dog.


Another story is of a community in Gujarat. Many of them were landless labourers. Some were cattle herders, some sold forest produce. They were also extremely talented artists, but were denied entry into temples. Therefore, they decided to create their own gods by painting their images on cloth. This led to a whole new art form of mobile temples on painted cloth. They worshipped their own goddess, Hadkai Mata, who rides a dog and protects people from measles.


Further south, in Maharashtra and Telangana, the dog is associated with the warrior gods Khandoba and Mallanna, respectively, and with Revanta, the god of the hunt, in central India. A legend depicts Khandoba’s wives futilely helping the deity collect the blood of the demon Mani, every drop of which was creating a new demon during battle. Finally, Khandoba’s faithful dog swallows all the blood, thus helping him kill the demons.


Indra, the mighty god of the Rig Veda, has a female dog named Sarama. She is considered the mother of all dogs. Sarama has a long history in Hindu mythology. It is believed that Indra sent her out to find his cows, which had been stolen by people known as the Panis. In some stories, she not only found the cows, hidden in the cave of the Panis, but also negotiated their recovery. This earned her the love and affection of Indra.


In the Mahabharata, Sarama and her children visit a sacrificial site where King Janmejaya is performing a yagna to kill all the nagas. Sarama’s children are accused of licking the pot of milk being used to prepare offerings to the gods. The king’s brothers throw stones at them to stop them. Enraged, Sarama curses that the yagna will be unsuccessful – and that is exactly what happens.


According to the Puranas, Sarama is the mother of all creatures with claws, while Surabhi is the mother of all creatures with hooves. Thus, Sarama is the mother of the lion as well as the tiger, and is linked to the wolf and the fox.

Dogs, in general, are associated with the aggressive form of Shiva known as Bhairava. Shiva lived on a mountain covered with snow where there was nothing to eat. This did not matter, for Shiva taught the bull, his companion, the art of overcoming hunger. Shiva loved the bull, but sometimes, he took the form of Bhairava, who loved dark places.


When Shiva became Bhairava, the dog became his friend. In art, Bhairava is visualised either as a ferocious alpha, riding a rabid dog, or as a child, also riding a dog. The former is called Kal Bhairava, or sometimes Kala Bhairava, associated with time, hence with death and destruction, and with darkness. The latter, the cherubic Bhairava, is called Batuk Bhairava, or Gora Bhairava, the childlike Bhairava, or the fair Bhairava.


The temple of Kilkari Bhairava is believed to have been established by the Pandavas at the entrance of Indraprastha (that now clings to the outer walls of Purana Qila in Delhi). Kilkari means squealing, the joyful cry of a child. Unlike the conventional temples of Shiva, there are no images of bulls here; only dogs which are the vahanas of Bhairava. The temple complex is full of dogs, who love the attention showered on them by devotees.


The Bhairava form of Shiva is kept outside the village and is associated with crematoriums. Dogs too are associated with crematoriums and the margins of society. Thus, the dogs of Bhairava may be associated with Sarama’s children, the Sarameyas, who, according to later texts, are the four-eyed guardians of the Land of the Dead.


This land is separated from the Land of the Living by the Vaitarini river. The dogs then become the companions of Yama. Thus, we find the dog associated with the wildest aspect of Shiva called Bhairava that essentially means “the one who removes the fear of death”.


Bhairava’s mildest form is the great teacher of teachers, Adinath Dattatreya. The Nath yogis are a special tradition of yogis that became popular over a thousand years ago. There are nine Naths, or Nav Naths, who wandered across India, Nepal and Southeast Asia, spreading their wisdom.


They all considered Dattatreya to be their guru. Dattatreya is imagined as a god accompanied by dogs and a cow. In art, he is shown with four mild-tempered dogs, often considered to be the embodiments of the four Vedas. They always walk in front of Dattatreya, frequently turning around, insecure and afraid that he will go away. Since Saraswati is the mother of the Vedas, some people argue that Sarama also represents the goddess Saraswati.



‘The Dogs of Bhairava’, by Devdutt Pattanaik, excerpted with permission from The Book of Dog, edited by Hemali Sodhi, HarperCollins India.


(Source: Scroll)

Monday, 29 March 2021

Adivasis are not Hindus. Lazy colonial census gave them the label

 There is a reason Jharkhand CM Hemant Soren's statement at Harvard's India Conference that Adivasis were never Hindus rattled the BJP and RSS.

Recently, the chief minister of Jharkhand and leader of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, Hemant Soren admitted that Adivasis were never Hindus and neither are they now. This was in response to his attempt to get Sarna Code approved by the Narendra Modi government at the Centre. The Sarna Code establishes a distinct, honourable identity for the Adivasis away from the Hindu identity — which is usually assumed as such for the Tribals. The dominant caste savarna Hindus have taken for granted the status of Adivasi and Dalits as being Hindu. It is used to construct a false notion of Hindu majority and thereby establish Bharat nation as Hindus’ land – Hindustan.


After Soren’s statement, the entire Hindu consensus, and especially the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), got rattled. 


They were shaken to the core. The mouthpiece of the RSS, Organiser, immediately released a statement accusing Soren of “parroting evangelical propaganda”. The RSS’ political offshoot, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), followed with accusations at Soren that he was benefiting from Christian missionaries.

A sitting, democratically elected chief minister and arguably the tallest leader of Adivasis in the country was put to test by caste denialists. The Constitution of India gives the responsibility to the State and society to protect and preserve Adivasi tradition as unique to India’s history. But the savarna advocates of the Hindu mission insist on Hinduising the Adivasis.


Representational image | Ministry of Tribal Affairs



The idea of Hindustan is enveloped as majoritarian nationalism. It is used by liberals, radicals, nationalists alike. When one declares the national Indian identity as one tied to the Hindu past, it brushes aside the glorious histories of independent, autonomous, anti-Brahminical legacy of the native people. The natives of India can be broadly classified into Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), and Other Backward Class (OBC) in constitutional terms. These natives were relegated to the lower status by the advent of Brahminism. Pushyamitra Shunga was one of the important Brahmin actors to have ironed the definition of political varna, which gave rise to the clean distinction of varna-based political economy. This meant extermination of Sramana traditions — those that gave rise to Jainism and Buddhism.


Almost everyone in the country falsely promotes the idea of Hindu majoritarianism. The defender and opponents alike use this historically incorrect and sociologically impossible definition of Hindu majoritarianism. The liberals get a piece of cake for framing the recent identity of Hindu-Muslim binarism. I have repeatedly opposed such limiting binaries. These binaries obviate Adivasis and Dalits as non-existing, useless, and irrelevant categories of people without any history of their own. Turns out, these binaries are the relic of the census data that have classified majority (Hindu) and minority (Muslim). Thus, the majoritarian consensus doesn’t need rationalisation. It can be qualified based on assumptions and beliefs — it becomes a matter of faith.


Fraudulent Census of India

Hindu majority is a faulty idea on many counts. It is a fraud committed by census takers from the time of British colonialism. The construction of Hindu is ahistorical. There is no prevalence of Hindu or Hinduism before the British census started putting Hindu as an identity in its census in 1881. Although the census was to take off in 1861 but the 1857 rebellion quashed those efforts. In 1872, it finally started to take shape but did not cover all of India.


Though British census was faulty, it gave the administration enough to regulate laws and decide for the ruled mass. Better governance was the primary objective of the State and knowing more about this extremely diverse nation was pursued by curious anthropologists. As census started to formalise over the years, Hindu began to become a more known identity. The Brahmins, as usual, jumped on this proposition to claim ownership over recently manufactured pan-India Hindu identity. Initially, the census covered disparate provinces.


The census chart of religion later classified into groups such as Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh, Parsi, Jewish, and Animist. Animist meant the aboriginal tribes who had not yet come under the influence of Hinduism, argues census scholar Bhagat. 


When Hindu was introduced in the census, there arose enormous problems. How to define a Hindu? There were two broad classifications of Shaivites and Vaishanvities, who were bitterly divided over the common belief. Then there are those who classify as Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj. Add to it the enormous divisions of caste and independent religious practices. Nevertheless, it had to be defined.


Hindu is anyone who is not “European, Armenian, Moghul, Persian or other foreign descent, who is a member of a recognised caste, who acknowledges the spiritual authority of Brahmans (priestly caste), who venerates or at least refuses to kill or harm kine, and does not profess any creed or religion which the Brahman forbids him to profess” [sic].


This gave a push for Brahmin interpreters like Arya Samaj, who merrily accepted this adjustment and promoted a common Indian identity as being Hindu. Social reformers at the time and the Congress party embraced this fallacious identity by setting a political agenda of mythical Hindu supremacist past. This worked in two ways. The first was to establish a historical sense of sovereignty in the past, and the second was to counter the European colonisers as ahistorical barbarous.


In 1911 census, Hindus were separated as genuine and non-genuine. The latter were those who denied Vedas, authority of Brahmins, did not have Brahmins into the fold, ate beef and did not revere cows.


This intervention by the British officials led many in the postcolonial scholarship to believe that caste was highlighted and incoherently promoted by the British. Thus, the controversial argument of caste becoming sharper during British period prevailed in the thesis of Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks. Many in the Right-wing interpreted this to say that the British imported caste from Europe by giving it an anglicised taste.


Census of 21st Century

The 2001 census found 1,700 religious categories apart from the dominant ones. They were clubbed into the ‘Other’ column. Adivasis are also clubbed into this. However, it is now being taken out in 2021 census, which indirectly puts them in the column of Hindu or other religious groups, Hemant Soren gestured.


The Indian State has issued the Socio-Economic Caste Census separate from the rest of the nation. The report is disturbing because it shows the marginalisation of Dalits and Adivasis on each level. The purpose of post-independence Indian census was to record the lives and stories of those on the margins in order to protect them.


Thus, the celebration of postcolonial nationalism does not only mean changing of colonial-era names and laws but getting rid of colonial-era laws and ignorant identities. India is an extremely complicated country. Each region, caste, sect, religion has its own history, and they are a nation in themselves. We cannot afford to combine them under a pretence of British-given identity. To rescue Adivasis from the stranglehold of Hindu is the real work of Birsa Munda, Sidhu, Kanhu Murmu, and Narayan Singh among scores of heroes and heroines.


The Brahmin and other Savarna castes only seem to care about Adivasis when the Christian missionaries are taking the word of equality propounded in their religion. Tribals like Dalits on the coastal regions and in Southern India immediately converted to Christianity in the colonial era as they did during the colonial Mughals to Islam. Brahmins, through organisations like the RSS, have started to convert Tribals to the Hindu fold. This is not very different from what Christian missions do.


Everyone who is indigenous to the land and worship their ancestral gods should be allowed to register as a non-Hindu with separate identity. As the Census of India 2001 report on religion stated, India is host to “indigenous faiths tribal religions which have survived the influence of major religions for centuries and are holding the ground firmly”. The Census of India is an ideal way to establish yourself without relying on the patronage of the oppressive majority. By forcing Dalits, Adivasis and many backward classes into the Hindu fold, the savarnas assume an undemocratic, unelected majority. The Adivasis and Dalits should be allowed to have a separate column in the religious census. This will be a tribute to their contribution to India’s freedom struggle and the nation as a whole.


Dr Suraj Yengde is Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School. He is the author of Caste Matters. He hosted Jharkhand CM Hemant Soren at the 18th edition of India Conference at Harvard. Views are personal.


(Source: The Print)

Thursday, 29 October 2020

In another India, Hindus and Muslims do marry without changing their faith

There has always existed a world in India beyond the imagination of fanatics, where religion is not one’s primary identity

I have lived through the #TanishqAd... my Muslim mother-in-law gifted me a mangalsutra and even godhbharai.”

Architect Rachna Lanewala, who tweeted this at the height of the Tanishq ad controversy last fortnight, is not the only woman to have “lived through” the experience depicted in the jewellery advertisement. Almost half a century ago, writer Saryu Rizvi’s parents would accompany each other to their respective shrines, be it the temple to get their new car blessed, or to the Karbala Maidan during Muharram.


There has always existed a world in India beyond the imagination of fanatics, where religion is not one’s primary identity, and a Hindu can marry a Muslim without either of them changing their faith. So, while in 1972, Saryu’s parents, hailing from Kanpur and Dehradun, could only consider getting married in Delhi, the question of conversion never came up.


Illustration for representative purpose.   | Photo Credit: R. Rajesh


Fully supportive

Neither did it come up in 1999 when Aasif Lanewala married his collegemate Rachna, whose parents, having migrated to Delhi after Partition, had warned her never to marry a Muslim. More than a thousand attended their Mumbai reception.

In 2012, journalist Mustafa Plumber, ignoring murmurs from the men in his family, declared that he wasn’t planning to convert his colleague Prachi Pinglay when they got married. After his younger brother’s nikaah, it was Prachi, guided by Mustafa’s mother, who performed the rituals expected of the eldest bahu (daughter-in-law).


The timeline from Saryu’s parents, who didn’t inform their families about their civil marriage right away, to Mustafa and Prachi, whose wedding was attended by both families, has not been a linear one.


Religious conversions happen even today, but far often than not, it is more a formality to please the families and not some “jihadi trap” as portrayed by the radical fringe. Thus Veena’s (name changed) conversion only meant a change in her official name. Straight after her wedding, her husband accompanied her to Tirupati for a long-desired pilgrimage.


Elopements too continue to take place in this world. In 1996, Vidya and Shoaib (names changed) fled to Vadodara after a secret wedding at the Registrar’s. Both belonged to joint families that had their own businesses. To their surprise, Shoaib’s parents called them back and hosted a grand dinner after a nikaah (marriage ceremony). Vidya’s uncle too, who had objected the most, became fully supportive.


Though Shoaib, despite having grown up in a Muslim locality, happily participated in Diwali pujas with his Marwari in-laws, Vidya took her new religion seriously — until she got drawn to meditation two years ago. Nobody had forced her to do namaaz and nobody objected when she stopped.


Secular upbringing

Contrary to popular belief, these Hindu-Muslim marriages are not restricted to the well-to-do. Masood Akhtar, who till recently lived in a slum, still wakes up to nightmares of the time he was beaten up by the police and put behind bars during the 1992-93 Mumbai riots. But he refused to let the trauma tarnish the secular upbringing he had had. As a boy, he would often accompany his father to his workshop to distribute Diwali sweets to his Hindu workers. When Masood informed his family that his Hindu fiancee’s name must remain unchanged after the nikaah, only his father supported him. Today, his joint family consults his wife Rama Shyam on everything. And every Durga Puja, Masood, Rama and their son go pandal-hopping.


The best part of this world is not the conservatives it manages to convert along the way, but the children born of such unions. Saryu fondly recalls her mother reading the Ramayana while the local maulana who had come to meet her waited patiently. “Accha, baaji paath padh rahi hai (Let sister finish reciting the Ramayana),” he would say. Her father named her after the U.P. river sacred to Hindus.


Aasif still regrets not being allowed to say ‘Indian’ in the religion column of his son’s birth certificate. When the child was four, he was asked by someone in Aasif’s hometown Dahod whether he was Hindu or Muslim. The cricket-crazy boy simply said, “I’m a Mumbai Indian”.


Mustafa finds that his two-year-old son has taken over what used to be his task on Diwali day — ringing the bell while Prachi performs Lakshmi puja. Sometimes, the toddler stands next to him when Mustafa performs the namaaz. “Let him find his own path,” say the parents.


Going forward, it is these children who will prove to be immune to the vitriol spewed by bigots.


(Source: The Hindu)

Thursday, 9 April 2020

There was a time ‘fake news’ was used to target ‘Hindus’ for spreading diseases

Racist and communal poison, backed by a section of the media and intelligentsia, has long been a staple of politics.

In these days of COVID-19, I am spending a lot of time catching up on history and it is clear that there are deep connections between the evils of our present times and what happened in days gone by. Whenever there is a clash between truth and belief, there is politics of the worst kind.

In his paper, ‘The historical perspective of Americans of Asian Indian origin 1790-1997’,  Srirajasekhar Bobby Koritala charts the course of Indian immigration to the United States – how the migrants found their feet and the hostility they faced on foreign lands because of outlandish beliefs about them. He lists two categories of people: ‘Great Americans’ who helped Indians in the US, and a ‘Rogues’ Gallery’, where, amongst others, he places Theodore Roosevelt – “racist, imperialist, colonialist, Anti-Asian, anti -Indian’. It is fortunate that despite the former US president’s official standing as a “historically respectable personality,” no one in the US has so far sought to dub Koritala an anti-national.
Source: The Sunday Puget Sound, Bellingham, WA, September 16, 1906.

From trade to labour
In the benign days before they became victims of racism, hundreds of Indians whose main occupation was trade travelled to the US in the 1880s and became so well known that plays like ‘The Rajahs Daughter’ and ‘Cataract of the Ganges’ were staged and there was a popular song titled ‘The Hindu Girl’.

However, things began to change a few years later when larger numbers of Indians, mostly Sikh farmers who migrated from Punjab on account of the unfair practices of the British colonial government, settled along the West Coast of North America, from California to Canada. Most of them worked in lumber mills in British Columbia and  Washington, and on the railroads. They started to do particularly well on the farms in the Sacramento region of California, but they aroused suspicion and were described as ‘treacherous’, ‘filthy’, the ‘least desirable race’, ‘unsanitary’ and carriers of deadly diseases. Evidently, their physical appearance, social customs and religion were not acceptable to the residents who were distrustful of anything not familiar and akin to their own.

Sarah Isabel Wallace in her book, Not Fit to Stay: Public Health Panics and South Asian Exclusion, notes that “while racism and fear of labour competition were at the heart of” exclusionary policies,  “public leaders – including physicians, union leaders, civil servants, journalists, and politicians – latched on to … unsubstantiated public health concerns”  to justify the exclusion of South Asians. She writes that this process began when a story broke in the Blaine Review in the fall of 1907 that the newly arrived South Asians working in the mills were responsible for a meningitis outbreak the previous spring. A Methodist bishop, James Mills Thoburn, who had lived in India for 30 years and had recently returned, said, “Hindoo immigration to the coast was responsible for a great deal of the plague, cere bro spinal meningitis and other disease that have been sweeping the country; South Asians were leaving India in the hopes of escaping the plague, the germs of which they carry with them.”

What Thoburn said was in the category of ‘fake news’, since it was not based on any scientific study, but it appealed to the US public who were in any case opposed to the migrants.

Sikhs, typically addressed as ‘Hindus’, with their traditional long hair, turbans and beards were particularly unacceptable. And then there was the perceived threat of losing jobs as this ‘pauper labour’ was evidently crushing them. Interestingly, US officials had no idea about the religions of India, and it is said that a copy of Koran was put into service in courts for ‘Hindus’ to swear on.

Slowly, anti-Asian hysteria started to build up in Canada and along the US Pacific coast. In 1905, racist Americans formed the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League and in 1907 a Canadian ‘Asia Exclusion League’ (AEL), appeared.

In 1906, Mary Wilson, living in Vancouver, wrote a letter to a local newspaper saying:  “We do not propose to have a Hindu town or bazaar rather, with its vicious evils and attendant undesirable element… We shall have the plague, cholera and other deadly fevers and diseases here among us, if such is not stopped in time.”


Antagonism towards Indians enchanted the press as negativity usually does. In a 1906 headline, the Puget Sound American asked its willing readers, “Have we a dusky peril?”, adding, in case the meaning was not clear: “Hindu hordes invading the state”. A reader wrote, “I consider their (Hindus) advent in this country very undesirable … their code of morals is bad (from our point of view) and if allowed the freedom, which they naturally expect in America, they will eventually become troublesome.”

‘Have We a Dusky Peril?’. Feature article in The Sunday Puget Sound, Bellingham, WA, September 16, 1906.
In a May 1907 article for the Pacific Monthly magazine titled ‘The Hindu Invasion; A New Immigration Problem’, Fred Lockley, a leading American journalist, wrote. “Our kinsmen (Indians) in the far East are turning their faces westward. Here and there a tiny crevice has appeared in the dam that has held them in check for so long. They are trickling through in a slight and apparently insignificant stream into the Western lands but will the stream gradually enlarge till it floods our lands and menaces our institutions?”

Significantly, the US Supreme Court did not initiate a National Population Register at the time. And the United States still does not have one.

But to proceed, the first public meeting of the AEL was held on August 12, 1907, where the MP of Vancouver warned of “an invasion of Asiatics who are swarming into our country every month” and ‘the inevitable result of this great influx of the yellow race will be the retreat of the white race already here”.

The next day, the Vancouver World newspaper headlined a story on its front page – ‘All Parties Opposed to Asiatics’ – and in its editorial wrongly reported that “with the arrival of 160 Hindus on the steamer Athenian and with 2,000 Japanese reported to be on the Indiana which sailed from Honolulu to Vancouver last Tuesday, it is evident that the invasion of Asiatics to British Columbia continues.” In today’s terms, this claim was fake news for the Indiana only had 275 Japanese but the newspaper never apologized.
‘The Hindu Invasion’. Pacific Monthly, 1907.

Anti-Indian riots
To encourage people to plod on, it is often said that Rome was not built in a day. Similarly, riots do not happen in a day. It is only when the mind is completely full of indoctrination and poison that riots happen. Hence what happened in Bellingham in the state of Washington on September 4, 1907, a Sunday when around 500 whites rioted, screaming, ‘Drive out the Hindus’ for about five hours and vandalised their houses and belongings, and took out several men and beat them up, it was not a one off incident. That night, 200 Indians were confined in the City Hall and the rest fled never to return.

But their escape to Everett did not help them and riots happened there on November 5, 1907, following the same pattern and typically the Police just watched. The next day, local newspapers reported that ‘the police were helpless’ and ‘all authority was paralyzed’.

‘Orientals buy arms’. The World (1907)

Not a single person from the mob was prosecuted. I do not intend to make this sound familiar. As I said, the reader’s freedom of deduction I shall honor.

Four days later, September 10, 1907, The World in Vancouver carried a news report, ‘Orientals Buy Arms. Hundreds of Asiatics Purchase Rifles,’ and that sale of weapons was stopped. I must say self- preservation often involves violent means.

Media justifications
After the riots, the Bellingham Herald on September 10, 1907 was of the opinion that, ‘ the Hindu is not of us and can never be……He brings nothing to our country but diseases and filth and a little labor,  in return for which he subtracts some of our capital.’

Though the newspaper condemned the violence, it concluded, ‘the Hindu is not a good citizen’, The Reveille said, “While any good citizen must be opposed to the means employed, the result of the crusade against the Hindus cannot but cause a general and intense satisfaction, and the departure of the Hindus will leave no regrets.”

The Seattle Morning Times argued it was “not a question of race, but of wages; not a question of men, but modes of life; not a matter of nations, but of habits of life… When men who require meat to eat and real beds to sleep in are ousted from their employment to make room for vegetarians who can find the bliss of sleep in some filthy corner, it is rather difficult to say at what limit indignation ceases to be righteous”

Just to be clear, racist or communal organisations with three-letter acronyms like the AEL were not alone in marginalising the Hindus (actually, all Indians). The wider intellectual class was complicit and lent immense legitimacy to these beliefs.

The potency of this vilification may be gauged from the content of tickets in the following format sold for a 1908 event. It says: ‘For your CHILDREN’S SAKE, Vote the Asiatic Exclusion League Ticket… GOOD MEN AND A GOOD CAUSE.’
Children were thus bartered for violence, and violence justified in the name of a good cause.

If this rings a familiar bell, please do not blame me. I am only setting out what history says, on trusting the written word.
To return to where I started, whenever there is a clash between beliefs and truth, politics plays its part. Thus the ‘Asiatic Barred Zone Act’ came to be enacted on February 4, 1917, which effectively meant that persons from barred zones, which included India, could not enter the United States, and thus Indians – and not ‘Hindus’ alone – became blacklisted for the purposes of immigration, on beliefs unsupported by truth.

Let us learn lessons from history. Let us not repeat mistakes, especially when human lives are involved. Let us not play politics with precious human lives.

(Source: The Wire.in)

Monday, 16 March 2020

The fate of Lahore’s Hindu temples show the city’s shift from a cosmopolitan to monolithic culture

In a city spread across 2,000 sq km, only two publicly-functioning Hindu temples remain.

Lahore was currently dealing with the aftermath of a heavy downpour – the price for a cool July day was having to walk through a muddy Ravi Road. We turned down a dim alleyway that was bordered by one of the numerous Sufi shrines that dot the city. In front of us loomed a tall building made of ashy white marble and shrouded by electric wires. On the same road was a cluster of shops, indistinguishable from any other neighbourhood market in inner-city Lahore.

We combed through each alley looking for signs that might guide us towards one of the last few functioning Hindu temples in Lahore – an orange flag, a spire on top of a building, a placard, anything. Instead, there were only more shops and dead ends.

A boy who had been watching us for some time asked what we were looking for. “Krishna Mandir”, we told him. He pointed in the direction of the white building, the one we had taken to be an office building.
Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore | Tayyab3425/Needpix.com [Public Domain]

A closer look revealed little else about the building. The gate was locked, and the windows were blacked out: The only way to see inside was a side entrance that was half covered by a curtain. Our only indication that this was a temple at all was the mellow scent of incense that surrounded the structure and a gold finial on the roof, visible only from several metres away.

Almost everything that complements the presence of a Hindu temple was divorced from this building. With the gates locked and windows darkened, it was as if the place had isolated itself from the busy bazaar that once facilitated its Diwali celebrations in the past. The mandir’s presence felt unwelcome in the neighbourhood, as if there was a conscious attempt to blend it into the surroundings.

According to the city’s Hindus, the inside of the Krishna Mandir feels equally unwelcoming. Raj Kumari, who has lived in Lahore since birth, says that the temple has no sitting room at all, save for a place to eat food and a latrine. “It is only a small two-story building with idols inside,” she says.

Despite being granted nominal religious freedom by Pakistan’s Constitution, Hindus like Raj Kumari still face extreme obstacles in being able to practise their faith. In a city of 11 million people across almost 2,000 sq km, only two publicly-functioning Hindu temples remain. One is the Krishna Mandir on Ravi Road, while the other is the Valmiki Mandir, located in New Anarkali.

“We’re not allowed to abandon our religion,” Raj Kumari says. But living in Lahore has severely impacted their visibility and how they practise their faith in public spaces. In order to fully appreciate how the Krishna and Valmiki Mandirs operate today, one must understand them within the greater context of Lahore and its spatial politics, whose complex history dates back long before the state of Pakistan was established. The foundation of Lahore, and Pakistan at large – namely, the Two-Nation Theory – depends on an exclusive definition of space, ultimately leading to social cleansing and contestation over control of spatial politics and architectural language in Lahore.

Communal violence
Lahore, as the already-developed political capital of several empires, was economically buttressed by the British Raj, becoming one of the largest and most advanced cities in the Indian subcontinent after the ascendance of the British Empire. In 1947, it was at the frontier of the Partition of India, a centuries-old union undone by years of communal violence underpinned by the Two-Nation Theory.
The Two-Nation Theory has dictated, to a great extent, spatial politics and architectural language in Pakistan. Credit: Rizwan Tabassum/AFP

The urban ecology of Lahore was defined by its spatial, religious and ethnic multiplicity. Lahore’s 1941 census highlights that Hindus and Sikhs comprised nearly 40% of the city’s population, forming the backbone of Lahore’s merchant class.

Reflecting this demographic diversity, Lahore was replete with mandirs and gurdwaras that hosted the city’s minority populations. Model Town, the first modern suburb built for the elite class in Lahore, was spearheaded by wealthy Hindu merchants.

However, the onset of Partition changed Lahore fundamentally as millions of people migrated across the newly-formed Indo-Pak border in 1947. The consequences for Lahore being demarcated as a part of Muslim Pakistan were colossal – thousands of Hindus and Sikhs fled their homes for India as Muslim rioters ravaged their properties and took their lives.

The Shah Alami Market, a bustling hub for Hindu traders and business elites, was captured entirely by a Muslim mob that had trapped its residents inside by setting the gate on fire. Bhagat Labha was 12 years old when he witnessed Shah Alami, the biggest market of Lahore, go up in flames. He recalls, “there were properties being burnt everywhere. None of us were allowed to go outside.” He narrowly escaped a Muslim mob during the communal unrest.

Vidya, also known as Mary, was living on Jail Road during Partition. “We used to come to the canal and play as kids,” she said. “We would see the dead bodies of massacred people there.” At the time, all of Vidya’s relatives were travelling to Lahore from India. None of them survived the journey.

Simultaneously, hundreds of Muslim refugees who faced identical violence in India were arriving into the city on a regular basis, filling in the gaps left empty by Hindu residents, all of whom had either left or had been murdered. The demographics of Lahore changed rapidly as its Muslim population grew and its Hindu and Sikh population declined. Today, Hindus and Sikhs constitute only 1% of Lahore’s population.

Transforming Lahore
A city-goer’s perception of Lahore is often dominated by its most well-known landmarks: the Badshahi Mosque, Liberty Market, Minar-i-Pakistan, Packages Mall, all conveniently located near the recently developed Metro stations. Amidst the novelty and fluctuating styles of architecture, it is easy to forget the presence of a heterogeneous society that continues to take residence within this same vicinity.
The Swaminarayan Temple in Karachi was a departure point for those migrating to India after the Partition. Credit: Haddid Uddin/Wikipedia (CC BY-3.0)

As the Muslim population continues to grow exponentially, the city takes the form of a monolithic space, all the while curbing traces of other religions. In this process, a Lahore that was once home to rich cultural and ethnic diversity quickly becomes a thing of the past. As per anthropologist Haroon Khalid, the Lahore that is now marked by huge infrastructure and everyday hustle that stretches beyond midnight conceals the Lahore that exists in historical imaginations.

In contemporary Lahore, the Krishna and Valmiki Mandirs are remains of the imagined city and its multiplicities. To understand the current dynamics of Lahore’s spatial politics and the extent of their deviation from the city’s indigenous foundations, one must dive back into the past and try to conceptualise this Lahore.

Today, just as we see Muslims heading to the Data Darbar on a Thursday evening, Hindus would visit the Seetla Mandir in Shah Alami for pooja. The stairs of the Lahore Fort casting its shadow on Hazuri Bagh, was the centre of Dussehra Jaloos that later spread to other parts of the city.

Looking at the rusty buildings and restaurants that are settled around the Lakshmi Chowk, the same neighbourhood was once drowned in colour as the centre of Holi. The high-spirited celebrations of Diwali were visible in the city’s temples, with decorations extending to Hindu neighbourhoods in the narrow streets of Anarkali.

Such festivals and religious practices were characterised by popular participation from all walks of life. Presently, however, these traditions are now secluded within the boundaries of homes instead of temples, resulting in dramatically fewer public displays of faith. The diminishing presence of Hindu spaces is key to how Lahore has fundamentally redefined itself since Pakistan’s independence.

The current state of Hindu temples and their significance within the city’s greater context hinges on the destruction and isolation of Hindu spatial expression that arose during Partition and continues to endure, reaching its zenith with the response to the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992.

Aftershocks of Babri
Hindu-Muslim differences crescendoed in Ayodhya in 1992, after decades of modern nation-building in India and Pakistan in light of the Two-Nation Theory – that Hindus and Muslims were indeed two different, irreconcilable nations.
Believed to be the birthplace of Ram, Ayodhya is an important pilgrimage site for Hindus all over the world. Until 1992, the town was also home to the famed Babri Masjid, a mosque whose construction is said to have been ordered by the Mughal Emperor Babur.
The aftershocks of the Babri Masjid demolition in Ayodhya, India, were also felt across the border. Credit: Douglas E.Curran/AFP

Ayodhya, with its rich Hindu and Muslim heritage, could have been a site for religious multiplicity but ultimately fell victim to communal hatred. Hindu nationalists claim that the Babri Masjid was built on the site where Ram was born and where a temple previously stood.

Calls to liberate Ram Janam Bhoomi, or Ram’s birthplace, from the ownership of Indian Muslims arose in the 1850s and culminated on December 6th 1992, when a group of Hindu nationalists led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Vishva Hindu Parishad demolished the mosque brick by brick.

The Babri Masjid demolition became the epicentre for a wider communal response, whose far-reaching consequences included the deaths of over 2,000 people in riots all over India, the majority of whom were Muslims. Consequently, parallel violence stretched across Indian borders into Pakistan and Bangladesh, where Muslim rioters razed dozens of Hindu and Jain temples to the ground in retaliation.

Tara Chand, a Hindu resident in Lahore, recalls being at work at the Valmiki Mandir one morning when a man rushed into the temple to warn him that he was in danger. “I ran outside to the street, and they all came with daggers, knives and guns, and set everything on fire,” says Tara Chand. “They took off the fans, they broke the idols...they left doing a lot of other damage.” The fire that consumed the Valmiki Mandir continued to rage for three days afterwards.

Shams Gill, who keeps his real Hindu name a secret in order to blend in, was attending a gathering at Mall Road that morning, protesting the demolition of the Babri Masjid in India along with other Muslim residents. Gill remembers hearing about numerous attacks on Hindu places of worship all over Pakistan. “Many temples in Lahore were destroyed,” he recalls, “including the temples in Ichra and the Jain temple near the university ground. They used tankers to run these to the ground.”

The destruction of the Babri Masjid and of temples all over Pakistan and Bangladesh is a demonstration of hostage theory, described by Abdul Kalam Azad as a means to assert minority rights: whatever treatment was given to Muslims in India would also be given to Hindus in Pakistan. This would keep “hostages” safe; the danger that could befall one’s religious brethren in the other country would be too great to ever risk hurting minorities in one’s own country.

But the founders never took into account that nation-building can also require the ethnic cleansing of the Other, regardless of one’s intention to protect a different country’s minorities. Ultimately, the episode only further exemplified the Two-Nation Theory and how spaces belonging to the Hindu or Muslim Other cannot be tolerated in the exclusive workings of the modern nation-state. Despite having a rich Hindu heritage that has existed long before Pakistan, it becomes essential to limit Hindu spaces as much as possible in order to reinforce the nation-state’s monolithic self-definition.

Destroying the mandirs was still not enough; all evidence of Hindu structures had to be erased and assimilated within Pakistan’s visibly Islamic landscape. The Seetla Mandir, a defunct site that had already been torn down during Partition riots, faced renewed violence, fueled by the same energy that tarnished it in the first place. A minaret was situated atop the Valmiki Mandir in a conscious effort to convert the building into a Muslim space.

The Krishna and Valmiki Mandirs were both eventually reconstructed after the aftershocks of the Babri Masjid demolition. Although they have been rebuilt as Hindu temples, they have not been rearticulated as such. Bhagat Lal Khokar is Valmiki Mandir’s long-time priest, whose family and associates have been the custodians of this land and temple for generations on end.

The Valmikis are considered to be untouchables in Pakistan, marginalising them within the Hindu community and within Pakistan. Many of them convert to Christianity and take Christian names but are still loyal to the Valmiki Mandir, compelling it to become a more syncretic space.

He describes the present state of the Valmiki Mandir to be modelled like classrooms adjoining an open space or offices at any ordinary plaza. “This is not what our temples look like,” he claims. The process of restoring both temples only further exemplifies the conscious effort to model these spaces as architecturally conformist, indistinguishable from any other building in the city, indeed for safety’s sake, but also as an easily assimilable and copyable architectural form that does not require unorthodox difference.

“All of Lahore’s gurdwaras look like gurdwaras, its churches look like churches, and its mosques look like mosques. Why doesn’t our temple look like a temple?” he asks us.

Tucked in a narrow street close to the famous bicycle shops of New Anarkali, the Valmiki Mandir presently looks like an abandoned house with khokhas and shops clustered along its outer boundary wall. The congestion of these shops and businesses leaves only a narrow space in between to be used as a door to the mandir. It can initially be recognised by the saffron coloured flag from a distance, standing side by side with the Pakistani flag at the entrance.

Once inside, you see an open space with a weathered brick floor and a semi-carpeted sitting area at one corner to accommodate visitors. The inner chambers of the temple are restricted to two small rooms, prone to flooding with even the slightest amount of rainfall. Inside the rooms, the garbhagriha occupies a central position, with the saffron-coloured flag taped to it at the forefront and the Pakistani flag again by its side.

“We did not put up the Pakistani flag as a form of protection,” Khokar says. “If anyone ever comes to try and disturb our temple again, the flag serves as a reminder that this space belongs to Pakistan just as any other building does. If they harm our land, then they should know that they are also harming Pakistan.”
Shri Krishna Temple in Mithi, Pakistan. Credit: Rizwan Tabassum/AFP

John, another congregant of the Valmiki temple, disagrees. “Why should we put up the Pakistani flag?” he asks us. “If we are so welcome in this place, then why do we need to constantly display our Pakistani identity? Mosques don’t even think about having Pakistani flags in their musalla. Why is the flag on our shrine itself?”

Capitalism and nation-building
Next to the grand lotus-petal Alamgiri Gate of the Lahore Fort rest the scattered ruins of the Lava Mandir, accidentally exhumed while the royal kitchen above the temple was being excavated. Hindu legend narrates that Sita and Ram’s son, Prince Lava, or Loh, founded the ancient city of Lavapur. The city would also be referred to by the prince’s latter name, Loh, becoming Loh-awar, eventually giving rise to the modern city of Lahore.

The abandoned temple has no congregation, only Hindu yatrees from across the border visit and worship at the Lava Mandir. The small room remains barricaded to Pakistanis and is easy to miss under the majesty of the Lahore Fort. Faded frescoes and well-worn arches surround the central shrine. The garbhagriha itself, comprised of an ancient stone pavilion topped with a lotus-adorned cupola, notably lacks any murtis in its hollowed-out middle. Instead, subdued garlands and burnt-out incense sticks mark the ephemeral visits that the temple hosts.

The dilapidated site of the Loh Mandir is a manifestation of the lack of public Pakistani investment in Hindu heritage sites, especially in Lahore. The durability of Hindu spaces in the city is not judged by their utility to the indigenous Hindu population, but rather their viability within a complex nexus of international relations and capitalist development.

The Kartarpur Corridor, for example, is the culmination of decades of Sikh diaspora activism to convince leaders on both sides of the border to open up a visa-free thoroughfare for Sikh pilgrims to visit Guru Nanak’s place of death. The brick-laying ceremony was attended by the prime minister of Pakistan and multiple ministers from India, both parties eager to co-opt the opening to soften India-Pakistan relations. Videos produced from the Kartarpur Corridor showcase large developments, an expansive highway and future plans for five-star hotels and world-star cuisine descending upon the space of this small ascetic gurdwara.

Similar arrangements for the repair of Lahore’s flagship gurdwara, Gurdwara Dera Sahib, were financed and organised by wealthy Sikh diaspora, rather than by the government agencies responsible for the upkeep of religious custodianship in Punjab, the Auqaf Department and the Evacuee Trustee Property Board.

While the government does facilitate the arrival of a few thousand Hindu and Sikh yatrees from across the border every year, it is particularly negligent and even exploitative of the precarious position of Pakistani Hindus living inside Lahore. At the Valmiki Mandir, John asserts that his fealty to the land runs deeper than both India or Pakistan. Bhagat Lal Khokar, the priest, tells us about how during and after Partition, the elders at the temple adamantly decided to stay in Lahore and care for their ancestral temple, even giving up portions of the large mandir complex to Muslim refugees coming in from India.

Those refugees never gave that property back. The temple’s land became increasingly encroached on by shops and khokas in the busy market, the rent from which was initially collected by the mandir. The Auqaf had started a Jinnah Fund for minority communities in the 1950s, and when they came to the Valmiki Mandir for contributions, the elders decided to give the rent from these khokas towards the Jinnah Fund.

However, the Jinnah Fund abruptly ended, yet the Auqaf did not remand revenue back to the mandir. Some congregants demanded that the dilapidated and encroached-upon mandir needed significant work, especially after the Babri Masjid demolition. This February, after decades of struggle, the Valmiki Mandir has finally filed a court case to regain revenue rights from their own property.

“We never ask the Auqaf Department for anything,” says Bhagat Lal Khokar, “All our festivals and celebrations we organise and finance ourselves for our brothers.”

Meanwhile, at the Krishna Mandir, the only other public functioning Hindu temple in the city, Diwali and other festivals are celebrated with huge fanfare with the economic support of the Auqaf, but with little substance as the entire road is barricaded and the Muslim community around the temple is prohibited from visiting.

That Muslims are not allowed to ring in festivals with the Hindu community further stratifies their religious identities, demarcating them at a point of difference. The Ministry of Religious Affairs visits the festival every year to take ceremonial photos, capitalising on the image of “inter-faith harmony,” but failing to account for the deteriorating state of the mandir.

This contestation of space hinges on the role of neoliberal capitalism in nation-state building. Not only do the Hindu temples fall under the coercive purview of the governmental departments with no other option, but they are also expected to accept and use these funds in a manner that suits the Pakistani ideology.

The specific deployment of Pakistan’s religious minorities is in service of Pakistani statehood as a benevolent caretaker. An image of “harmony” only holds insofar as it is relevant to the respective countries’ nation-state ideologies, but never for the sake of safeguarding minorities and their religious freedom.

Nation-building is inextricably linked to capitalist development in Pakistan. The only mode of “developing” property under capitalism is in the name of profit, and government agencies follow suit. In the case of the Valmiki Mandir and its outlying khokhas, these Muslim-led agencies take coercive control of the mandir’s property and benefit from their rented shops.

Meanwhile, in the case of the Kartarpur Corridor, the framework for free market profit has already been laid around the epicentre of the gurdwara. The opportunity to benefit from unorthodox religious spaces is ripe under Pakistan’s neoliberal regime, as Islamic nationalism is upheld and development grows at the expense of further limiting Hindu spaces to the point of social cleansing. Therefore, these unorthodox, non-Muslim religious spaces only become relevant in the context of profit.

Spatial politics
“In Pakistan, the Hindus have never been persecuted,” says Shams Gill, “but the anger against us has been vented on our temples.” Gill has reached the crux of the issue: Pakistani Hindus, a term that many consider to be an oxymoron, are represented through physical space.

Now, there are only a few traces of Hindu visibility in Lahore, such as the building once known as the Hanuman Basuli Mandir. Its shikhara peaks through the newly constructed plazas and old heritage buildings of the Anarkali Bazaar. This mandir, now a residence to numerous families, is easily distinguishable from its surroundings. It stands out with its antique Hindu architectural language, sculptures of deities whose faces have been scratched out and Sanskrit wall engravings that the city has grown to neglect over time.

The mere presence of the mandir in the midst of the crowded bazaar exemplifies the extent of capitalist development that continues to dictate the marginalisation of Hindu temples and sacred spaces within Lahore. After so many attempts to remove evidence of Hindu visibility in Lahore, the Hanuman Basuli Mandir, no longer functioning as a temple, remains the sole survivor of these efforts.

However, the building’s future remains precarious in the contemporary political climate. History tends to repeat itself, and there is no certainty regarding the fate of Lahore’s unorthodox religious spaces.

This article first appeared on Dawn.

(Source: Scroll)