Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Wednesday, 23 December 2020

Fresh perspectives on medieval Deccan history

 Two recent books, which focus on the Deccan Sultanates of the 16th and 17th centuries, and which chart the connections between the Deccan and Iran, serve to considerably enrich the growing corpus of medieval Deccan history.

Over the past few years, there has been a burgeoning interest in the history of the medieval Deccan, a region that was ignored in the early modern history writing traditions of the 20th century. Undoubtedly, the Sultanates of the medieval Deccan were imbricated in the politics of their neighbours, but their long and independent existence of more than 300 years did not get the scholarly scrutiny they rightly deserved. Thus, the increasing attention paid to it by historians over the past few years is welcome. The two new books under review, one by Roy S. Fischel, a historian at the School of African and Oriental Studies, London and the other edited by the independent art historian Keelan Overton, add considerably to our understanding of this epoch in the Deccan.


Local States in an Imperial World: Identity, Society and Politics in the Early Modern Deccan by Roy S. Fischel, Edinburgh University Press, 2020.



The history of the medieval Deccan, and especially that of the Bahmani and its legatee Sultanates, can be bookended by two events precipitated by rulers from northern India. The centrifugal melee unleashed over most of the Indian subcontinent as Mohammed Tughlaq’s (1325-1351) hold over his sprawling empire weakened gave rise to the independent Bahmani Sultanate in 1347, delinking the Deccan from both northern and southern polities. The Bahmanis, who had frequent skirmishes and wars with their southern (Vijayanagara) and eastern (Gajapathi) neighbours, ruled over vast areas of the upper Deccan plateau up to the Krishna river until the end of the 15th century when the Sultanate spectacularly imploded due to internecine differences among the “foreign” and “native” components of its nobility.


The provincial governors of the Bahmanis soon fortified their claims over their governorates, inaugurating the era of the Deccan Sultanates. Of the five legatee Sultanates of Ahmednagar (Nizam Shahi), Bijapur (Adil Shahi), Golconda (Qutb Shahi), Berar (Imad Shahi) and Bidar (Barid Shahi) that emerged from the Bahmani system, the former three survived as robust and large states into the 17th century. The Mughals, eager to extend their territorial domain, had long set their eyes on the Deccan, and finally absorbed Ahmednagar during the reign of Shah Jahan (1628-1658). Later, Aurangzeb (1658-1707), who had an intimate knowledge of the Deccan and who had, for long, sought to quell the Shiite rulers of the region, snuffed out the independent Deccan Sultanates of Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687), briefly extending the domain of the Mughal Empire to its apogee.

In post-independent India, the volume History of Medieval Deccan, 1295-1724 by H. K. Sherwani and P. M. Joshi (1975) drew attention to this region as distinct in space and time. The works of the prolific historian Richard M. Eaton, such as Sufis of Bijapur, 1300-1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India (1978), A Social History of the Deccan, 1300-1761: Eight Indian Lives (2005) and Power, Memory, Architecture: Contested Sites on India’s Deccan Plateau co-authored with Phillip Wagoner (2014), have added considerably to our knowledge of this period. George Michell and Mark Zebrowski’s Art and Architecture of the Deccan Sultanates (1999) was instrumental in focussing the interest of scholars on the Deccan. The publication of Sultans of the South: Arts of India’s Deccan Courts, 1323-1687 (2011) and Sultans of Deccan India, 1500-1700: Opulence and Fantasy (2015), two lavish volumes put together by Navina Najat Haidar and Marika Sardar, following exhibitions at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, also focussed attention on the medieval Deccan.


In the past two years, several new books on this era have been published and subsequently reviewed in the pages of Frontline, including Manu Pillai’s Rebel Sultans: The Deccan from Khilji to Shivaji (See “The Deccan Chronicles” Frontline, May 10, 2019), Pushkar Sohoni’s The Architecture of a Delhi Sultanate: Courtly Practice and Royal Authority in Late Medieval India (See “Deccan Architecture” Frontline, August 2, 2019), George Michell and Helen Philon’s Islamic Architecture of Deccan India, T.N. Devare’s A Short History of Persian Literature: At the Bahmani, the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi Courts—Deccan and Emma J. Flatt’s The Courts of the Deccan Sultanates: Living Well in the Persian Cosmopolis (See “The Medieval Deccan” Frontline, December 20, 2019). The two books under review are the latest addition to the swelling corpus on the medieval Deccan.


Non-imperial states

Roy Fischel’s primary focus is on the Deccan Sultanates after the implosion of the Bahmani Sultanate. His main argument is that the Deccan Sultanates were “an example of non-imperial political organisations in the early modern world.” He bases this on the fact that the “key features of these sultanates were multiplicity and negotiation rather than expansion and centralisation”. This argument is borne out by the fact that none of the Deccan Sultanates tried to take “over the region in its entirety”. The “multiplicity” that Fischel mentions here is because the elite of the Deccan Sultanates had eclectic ethnicities. The main division and source of tension here was between the Deccanis or the “locals” (an ethnically diverse group consisting of the Muslim nobility who had come down along with the Tughlaq regime, local converts, the African-origin Habshis and the non-Muslim elites of the region) who had strong ties to the region and the “foreigners” (primarily Iranian migrants who were attracted to the opportunities in the Deccan and had trans-continental linkages).


This division of the nobility meant that “the ruling houses (of the Sultanates) had a special role in maintaining a delicate equilibrium between various actors by taking into consideration each group both politically and symbolically”. Considering that there were “multiple trajectories” operating in each Sultanate, the system of the state that emerged was unique “marking it as distinct from the top-down system typical of, or aspired by, the contemporary empires.”


In the first chapter, Fischel discusses the various meanings of the term “Deccan” in terms of its geography, political imaginations and linguistic-cultural understandings. He also narrates the history of the region from 1000 CE, and writes that “with these divisions, it is clear that there is no one satisfactory definition of the Deccan”. Yet, borrowing a concept from geographer Doreen Massey to understand a “region as a space”, Fischel argues that “this geographical, political, historical and cultural understanding of the Deccan as comprising a set of subunits in varying relations provides a useful tool for analysis of the region and the constraints within which the rulers were operating. First and foremost, was the need to keep it all together in a diverse and changeable environment, in which various forces operated against unity.” Through this initial chapter, Fischel demonstrates the “multiple spaces of the Deccan”.


Deccani-foreigner divide

In the next chapter, Fischel takes his narrative of the history of the Deccan ahead until the 1630s while focussing on ideas of the local, peripheral and foreign. He looks closely at the identity and the politics of the Deccanis who were “most closely associated with the core region of the Deccan”. The Deccanis had diverse origins; Fischel suggests that this was a “political identity” as the Deccanis emerge as a group in Persian chronicles “in parallel to their main opponents, namely, the Foreigners.”


Linguistically, they were associated with the emerging Dakhani language. Fischel also makes an interesting argument in this section when he says that the Deccani-foreigner divide was the main source of tension among the elites of the time rather than the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims which “seem to have been calmer, as far as we can say based on the sources.” Thus, the great (Hindu) empire of Vijayanagara seems to have been “regularly included in the political system of the Deccan” whereas the Mughals and the Sultanate of Gujarat were perceived to be outsiders.


The “foreigners”, migrants from Iran who came to the Deccan because of the opportunities afforded, the “extensive use of Persian practices and language”, and because it was relatively more stable than north India at the time, form the theme of Fischel’s next chapter. The foreigners were remarkably influential in the Bahmani and Deccani Sultanates and were much sought after. Often treated as a cohesive political group, they were nevertheless diverse and offered unique skills and training, a “marketable commodity” in the Deccan which helped them maintain “their high position in Indian politics”. The migrants continued to retain their linkages with their homelands which “marks one of the main characteristics that distinguished the foreigners from the Deccani environment. Operating in trans-regional, usually urban networks, Foreigners were connected beyond boundaries.” They maintained these links because of their family networks and their skill sets, which meant that they were also able to swap patrons among the Deccan Sultanates, with some of them even moving over to the Mughals who were considered as outsiders by the Deccanis. There is a widely accepted theory that there was a Shia-Sunni divide that layered the tension between the foreigners and Deccanis, but Fischel disagrees with this.


Just before the interlude from Delhi and the Bahmani ascendance, the Deccan was ruled by the Yadavas, the Hoysalas and the Kakatiyas. The way in which the Deccan Sultanates sought to localise their rule by assimilating non-Muslim elites in the state system as well as by consciously incorporating pre-Sultanate imperial traditions is discussed by Fischel in his next chapter, where he focusses on Bijapur and Golconda. This process became even more important after the demise of Vijayanagara at the Battle of Talikota in 1565.


This exercise was easy for Golconda, which inherited the well-defined Telugu linguistic zone of Telangana from the Kakatiya rulers. The process was trickier for Bijapur, which ruled the area that fell between the core regions of the Marathi and Kannada lands and whose core was away from the centres of past non-Muslim dynasties like the Yadavas and the Hoysalas. Here, Fischel makes a radical argument linking “Bijapur directly to Vijayanagara.” Fischel’s evidence to support this potentially tendentious argument stems from the treatment of the Vijayanagara king Krishnadevaraya (r. 1510-1529) in certain Persian sources, the Bijapur rulers’ engagement with Indic ideas, and the way in which Bijapur under Ibrahim Adil Shah II (r. 1580-1627) celebrated Id-i Nauras mimicking, in form at least, the Vijayanagar celebration of Mahanavami which preceded Dasara. Fischel writes: “This continuation not only emphasises the political centrality of the festival, but also hints at the possibility of its reincarnation in post-Talikota Bijapur. The similarity between certain aspects of Id-i Nauras and the Mahanavami is striking.”


While the Deccan Sultanates ruled the Deccan for a considerable period, there were certain limitations to the Deccani system which are discussed in Fischel’s next chapter. For instance, the Qutb Shahi state of Golconda could not expand beyond the core of the Telugu country and its authority, when it was there, remained weak in Andhra and Rayalseema regions. There were also certain distinct local factors that led to the decline of Ahmednagar (where the Habshi Malik Ambar and Marathas gained ascendancy in the early 17th century), Bijapur and Golconda when challenged by the Mughals.


Iranian connection

Keelan Overton has brought together works of both advanced as well as younger scholars in this richly produced volume of interdisciplinary essays teeming with photographs that “chart the travels and fortunes of Iranian elites and Persian cultural norms across a transregional Iran-Deccan geography” between 1400 and 1700 CE. Since the establishment of the Bahmani Sultanate in the Deccan, the region was a favoured destination for the Iranian elite. Even as they thrived in the Deccan, these migrants retained their links with their homes across the Indian Ocean. As part of the cabal of “foreigners” in the nobility of the Deccan, they were a crucial component in the politics of the era. Two of these first-generation migrants, Yusuf Adil Shah (1450-1510) and Qutb Shah (1470-1543), even went on to found the longest surviving Deccan Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda respectively.


Keelan Overton’s prefatory essay provides the context of these peregrinations. She writes that for many Iranian elites, “it is useful to frame mobility through two temporal lenses. The first involves the initial migration from Iran to the Deccan…and the push-and-pull factors that informed this decision, which were both forced and voluntary…The second temporal frame concerns the migrant’s (or simply itinerants) circulations within the Deccan plateau and Indian subcontinent at large.” The “push” factor that Keelan Overton mentions here could include “political instability and warfare”, “a rift with a ruler-patron” and so on, whereas the most significant lure of the subcontinent was “its wealth and economic prospects.” Keelan Overton has also included a valuable appendix to her chapter which acts as a handy reference guide to tracing the careers of 48 Iranian elites as they moved from Iran across the Deccan Sultanates and even to the Mughal court. Thus, we can see how someone like Malik “Ain ul-Mulk” Gilani (d. 1593), who was from Gilan in Iran, fluidly moved across the courts of Bidar, Bijapur and Vijayanagara, the last of which is sometimes considered a “Hindu” empire. The ease of the elite’s movement shows that in reality it was a part of the Deccani system.


In three chapters which are brought together under the theme “Iranian Elites and Their Trails”, Keelan Overton clubs together papers that focus on “the human conduits at hand”. Thus, questions such as who were these Iranian elite and why did they migrate to the Deccan, how did they self-identify and what contributed to their success and failure are addressed. The two historians Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam, whose joint forays have brought about paradigmatic shifts in the study of the early modern South Asian world, provide an important backdrop for the book under review as they chronologically look at this migration with a couple of case studies to demonstrate their point. Wheeler Thackston’s translation of an excerpt from Rafi al-Din Shirazi’s Tazkirat al-Muluk on Yusuf Adil, the founder of the Bijapur Sultanate, is a useful account to understand the path of this migrant who was destined for greatness in the Deccan. Shirazi writes that when Adil was destitute in Lar (in Iran) and was being pursued by his father’s enemies, “he had a vision of an aged and very impressive man” who said, “You must go to the Deccan, for your bread will be cooked there.” Roy Fischel has also contributed a chapter in Keelan Overton’s book which covers the same terrain as the third chapter of his book where he closely looks at the “foreigners”.


In the next two chapters, Keelan Overton discusses “Bidar in the International Timurid”. Bidar was the capital of the Bahmani Sultanate when Ahmed Shah (r. 1422–1436) moved his court there sometime after he ascended the throne. Relations between Iran and the Deccan accelerated after this shift. Royal ships were regularly dispatched to the Persian Gulf to lure the Iranian elite to cross the Arabian Sea. Peyvand Firouzeh maps “the nexus between individuals and visual and textual material that coalesced in fifteenth century Bidar” by looking closely at the “calligraphy network”, which means “people and objects connected through the art of writing” between Iran and the Deccan. One part of Firouzeh’s examination looks at the links between the family of the Sufi Shah Nimatullah and the royals of the Bahmani Sultanate. In the next chapter, Sheila Blair and Jonathan Bloom closely study the architecture of the madrasa of Mahmud Gavan (d. 1481), often called the “prime minister” of the Bahmani court. Blair and Bloom argue that the architecture of the madrasa derived from Iranian/Central Asian models. They also go a step ahead and “link the structure directly to Khurasan” and suggest that the “architectural transfer” was undertaken by “a plan rather than a person”.


The next three chapters deal with “Religious Codices and Shi’i Sectarianism” and are “concerned with a religious codex that flowed between Iran-Deccan worlds.” Maryam Habibi formally analyses the Quran manuscript endowed to the shrine of Imam Riza in Mashhad (in Iran) by Ibrahim Qutb Shah of Golconda (r. 1550-1580), a linkage that reified Ibrahim’s Shi’i creed. The next chapter is a translation of the endowment deed that is in the Quran manuscript. The subsequent chapter by Rachel Parikh is a close study of the Falnama (Book of Omens) that was created in the Qutb Shahi Golconda court. While there are four other Falnamas that were created, the relative anonymity of the Golconda Falnama “is most likely due to the fact that it is not ‘mainstream’, that is, neither Safavid or Ottoman.” Parikh demonstrates that this volume, which contains 37 illustrations, was “part of the Qutb Shahi dynasty’s larger initiative of promoting its political power and assimilation into the Safavid empire” and that it “reflects Shi’i political identity.”


Keelan Overton, Kristine Rose-Beers and Bruce Wannell examine the St. Andrews Quran manuscript which, as a religious codex, had a fascinating trajectory. It was produced during the Safavid-era in Tabriz or Herat, from where it found its way to Bijapur under Ibrahim Adil Shah II (r. 1580-1627); the Mughal library during the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb; the minor state of Savanur and then to the Mysore court of Tipu Sultan (r. 1782-1799). After Tipu’s defeat, the Quran travelled to Calcutta (now Kolkata), then London and ultimately to the University of St. Andrews in Scotland where it remains to this day. The authors write that the St. Andrew’s Quran “encapsulates a staggering number of agendas and authenticities and flowed seamlessly between Timurid, Safavid, Mughal and Deccani worlds.”


While Chapters 11 (by Jake Benson) and 12 (by Hamidreza Ghelichkhani) discuss “Album Culture, Calligraphy and Diplomacy”, Chapters 13 and 14 are explorations of “Dakhni Literature and History” by Sunil Sharma and Subah Dayal.

Both the books under review provide new perspectives on the medieval Deccan. Fischel’s pioneering argument linking Vijayanagara and Bijapur stands out because it weakens conventional scholarship that has argued that the Battle of Talikota was a religious confrontation (See “Beyond the Hindu-Muslim Binary” Frontline, January 18, 2019). It would help if the author expanded his bibliography to Kannada and Marathi sources while developing this argument further. A recent project that translated 21 volumes of Adil Shahi-era material to Kannada may provide some new responses on this argument from historians in Karnataka (See “Making History Accessible” Frontline, June 21, 2019).


In her introduction, Keelan Overton writes that the intention of the edited volume is to provide “foundational tools and sources for the ongoing integration of the region (the Deccan) into textbook studies of the Indo-Persian and early modern global worlds.” One aspect of the interaction between the Iran and the Deccan which could perhaps have been added to the volume is the manner in which the ritual of Muharram emerged as the chief public event in the Shi’i Sultanates of the Deccan, and transmogrified later into a syncretic local event which is still marked across thousands of villages and towns in the Deccan (See “Muharram Celebrations in North Karnataka: A Festival of Harmony” Frontline, October 11, 2019).


(Source: Frontline)


Tuesday, 24 November 2020

Qatar farm starts harvesting saffron for first time

A Qatar farm has started harvesting saffron for the first time in the country and is eyeing 25 percent local market share.

Jaber Al Mansouri, owner of Saffron Qatar


Saffron Qatar, located in Um Lushoosh, North of Qatar, marked the opening of the harvest season today and was attended by officials from Ministry of Municipality and Environment, Qatar Chamber and Hassad Food.



“We are very happy to inaugurate the first farm in Qatar that produces saffron, as these plants are usually found in Iran, Morocco, Afghanistan, Spain and other countries. Today we celebrate the inauguration of the farm,” Jaber Al Mansouri, the owner of the farm, said.


The farm uses latest technologies for cultivating saffron like hydroponic - soilless – and also using soil in special containers.



“We want to expand the project to increase the produce to supply to the local market as a Qatari product. We expect to meet 25% of Qatar market needs,” Al Mansouri added.


(Source: The Peninsula)

Tuesday, 4 August 2020

Coronavirus: Iran cover-up of deaths revealed by data leak

The number of deaths from coronavirus in Iran is nearly triple what Iran's government claims, a BBC Persian service investigation has found.

The government's own records appear to show almost 42,000 people died with Covid-19 symptoms up to 20 July, versus 14,405 reported by its health ministry.

The number of people known to be infected is also almost double official figures: 451,024 as opposed to 278,827.

The official numbers still make Iran the worst-hit in the Middle East.

In recent weeks, it has suffered a second steep rise in the number of cases.

The first death in Iran from Covid-19 was recorded on 22 January, according to lists and medical records that have been passed to the BBC. This was almost a month before the first official case of coronavirus was reported there.

Iran has been the worst-affected country in the Middle East. Getty Images

Since the outbreak of the virus in Iran, many observers have doubted the official numbers.

There have been irregularities in data between national and regional levels, which some local authorities have spoken out about, and statisticians have tried to give alternative estimates..

A level of undercounting, largely due to testing capacity, is seen across the world, but the information leaked to the BBC reveals Iranian authorities have reported significantly lower daily numbers despite having a record of all deaths - suggesting they were deliberately suppressed.

Where did the data come from?
The data was sent to the BBC by an anonymous source.

It includes details of daily admissions to hospitals across Iran, including names, age, gender, symptoms, date and length of periods spent in hospital, and underlying conditions patients might have.

The details on lists correspond to those of some living and deceased patients already known to the BBC.

The source says they have shared this data with the BBC to "shed light on truth" and to end "political games" over the epidemic.

The discrepancy between the official figures and the number of deaths on these records also matches the difference between the official figure and calculations of excess mortality until mid-June.

Excess mortality refers to the number of deaths above and beyond what would be expected under "normal" conditions.

What does the data reveal?
Tehran, the capital, has the highest number of deaths with 8,120 people who died with Covid-19 or symptoms similar to it.

The city of Qom, the initial epicentre of the virus in Iran, is worst hit proportionally, with 1,419 deaths - that is one death with Covid-19 for every 1,000 people.

It is notable that, across the country, 1,916 deaths were non-Iranian nationals. This indicates a disproportionate number of deaths amongst migrants and refugees, who are mostly from neighbouring Afghanistan.

The overall trend of cases and deaths in the leaked data is similar to official reports, albeit different in size.

The initial rise of deaths is far steeper than Health Ministry figures and by mid-March it was five times the official figure.

Lockdown measures were imposed over the Nowruz (Iranian New Year) holidays at the end of the third week in March, and there was a corresponding decline in cases and deaths.

Iran has introduced measures to try to curb the spread of coronavirus. AFP

But as government restrictions were relaxed, the cases and deaths started to rise again after late-May.

Crucially the first recorded death on the leaked list occurred on 22 January, a month before the first case of coronavirus was officially reported in Iran.

At the time Health Ministry officials were adamant in acknowledging not a single case of coronavirus in the country, despite reports by journalists inside Iran, and warnings from various medical professionals.

In 28 days until the first official acknowledgement on 19 February, 52 people had already died.

Who were the first whistleblowers?
Doctors with direct knowledge of the matter have told the BBC that the Iranian health ministry has been under pressure from security and intelligence bodies inside Iran.

Dr Pouladi (not their real name) told the BBC that the ministry "was in denial".


"Initially they did not have testing kits and when they got them, they weren't used widely enough. The position of the security services was not to admit to the existence of coronavirus in Iran," Dr Pouladi said.

It was the persistence of two brothers, both doctors from Qom, which forced the health ministry to acknowledge the first official case.

When Dr Mohammad Molayi and Dr Ali Molayi lost their brother, they insisted he should still be tested for Covid-19, which turned out to be positive.

In Kamkar hospital, where their brother died, numerous patients were admitted with similar symptoms to Covid-19, and they would not respond to the usual treatments. Nevertheless, none of them were tested for the disease.

Dr Pouladi says: "They got unlucky. Someone with both decency and influence lost his brother. Dr Molayi had access to these gentlemen [health ministry officials] and did not give up."

Dr Molayi released a video of his late brother with a statement. The health ministry then finally acknowledged the first recorded case.

Nevertheless state TV ran a report criticising him and falsely claiming the video of his brother was months old.

Why the cover-up?
The start of outbreak coincided both with the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and with parliamentary elections.

These were major opportunities for the Islamic Republic to demonstrate its popular support and not risk damaging it because of the virus.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, accused some of wanting to use the coronavirus to undermine the election.
In the event, the election had a very low turnout.

Iran's cover-up after it shot down a Ukrainian airliner fuelled anti-government protests. Getty Images

Before the global coronavirus pandemic hit, Iran was already experiencing a series of its own crises.

In November 2019, the government increased the price of petrol overnight and cracked down violently on protests which followed. Hundreds of protesters were killed in a few days.

In January this year, the Iranian response to the US assassination of top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, seen as one of the most powerful figures in Iran after its Supreme Leader, created another problem.

Then Iranian armed forces - on high alert - mistakenly fired missiles at a Ukrainian airliner only minutes after it had taken off from Tehran's international airport. All 176 people on board were killed.

The Iranian authorities initially tried to cover up what happened, but after three days they were forced to admit it, resulting in considerable loss of face.

Dr Nouroldin Pirmoazzen, a former MP who also was an official at the health ministry, told the BBC that in this context, the Iranian government was "anxious and fearful of the truth" when coronavirus hit Iran.

He said: "The government was afraid that the poor and the unemployed would take to the streets."

Dr Pirmoazzen points to the fact that Iran stopped international health organisation Médecins Sans Frontières from treating coronavirus cases in the central province of Isfahan as evidence of how security-conscious its approach towards the pandemic is.

Iran was going through tough times even before the military showdown with the US and coronavirus hit.

The sanctions which followed Donald Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018 hit the economy hard.

Dr Pouladi says: "Those who brought the country to this point don't pay the price. It is the poor people of the country and my poor patients who pay the price with their lives."

"In the confrontation between the governments of the US and Iran we are getting crushed with pressures from both sides."

The health ministry has said that the country's reports to the World Health Organization regarding the number of coronavirus cases and deaths are "transparent" and "far from any deviations".

(Source: BBC)

Friday, 8 May 2020

Fears rise Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe may be returned to Iran jail

Concern over British-Iranian dual-national after another prisoner ordered back to prison

The husband of the British-Iranian dual-national Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe says he fears his wife may be returned to jail in Iran in the next few weeks after another prominent prisoner was ordered back behind bars.

Aras Amiri, a UK-based Iranian national and former British Council employee, was ordered back to jail at the weekend after being furloughed on 9 April.

Nearly half of Iran’s political or security prisoners were released as part of a wider prisoner release programme implemented amid fears Covid-19 was about to sweep through Iran’s jails.

Zaghari-Ratcliffe has been staying at her parents’ home in Tehran since the middle of March, when she was released and made to wear an electronic tag.
Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe following her release from prison in March. Photograph: Free Nazanin campaign/AFP via Getty Images
Her husband, Richard Ratcliffe, said: “Our thoughts are with Aras and her family. Walking back into prison is no easy thing. For Nazanin’s case, I am interpreting Aras Amiri’s return as a bad sign, that the wind is threatening to change. Others are also being summoned.

“I take it as a signal to the UK that patience is not infinite, and that we all continue to be in their chess game. I have asked the Foreign Office for the UK ambassador in Tehran to go and visit Nazanin, for the added diplomatic protection, and the signal that the government is not afraid even in Iran to stand publicly by its citizens.”

Another British-Iranian, Anoosheh Ashoori, has been kept in jail on the basis he was serving a longer sentence, even though at the age of 66 he was more vulnerable to the disease than younger prisoners serving shorter sentences.

Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s daughter is in London, and the family have been in daily contact via Skype.

Zaghari-Ratcliffe, who has more than a year to serve of a five-year sentence imposed in 2016, has not been granted clemency as her family hoped. Some signals have been sent about Iran’s ministry of foreign affairs seeking a prisoner swap, mainly for US prisoners, on the basis that imprisoned Iranians in US jails were at risk from Covid-19. but nothing substantive has occurred. The most likely time for a mass enforced return to jails will be after the end of Ramadan in less than a fortnight.

Tensions between Iran and the west have risen again with the US threatening to find a way to prevent a five-year arms embargo on Iran expiring in October, as stipulated in the original 2015 nuclear deal. The US is claiming it is still legally a party to the nuclear deal it signed in 2015, even though Donald Trump withdrew in 2018. By being party to the deal, the US can call for the reimposition of sanctions against Iran that existed before 2015.

Majid Takht-e-Ranchi, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, told Etemad newspaper the US position was a joke, but the US move places diplomatic pressure on the UK, France and Germany, the three European signatories to the deal.

(Source: The Guardian)

Monday, 9 March 2020

Qatar temporarily suspends entry for travellers from 14 countries

Qatar’s Government Communications Office said Sunday that in addition to Qatar Airways' announcement regarding flights to and from Italy, entry to Qatar is temporarily suspended for all those intending to travel from certain countries, as of March 9, 2020.

The decision comes as a preventive measure due to the spread of coronavirus, COVID-19, worldwide.
Hamad International Airport (file photo)

The GCO statement said the decision covers the following countries: Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria and Thailand.

The decision affects all individuals intending to enter from these countries, including visas upon arrival, those with a residence or work permit, and temporary visitors.

The statement said the step comes in line with Qatar’s efforts to take all necessary preventive measures to limit the spread.

The State of Qatar urges all citizens and residents to avoid all but essential travel at this time.


The statement said that these precautionary measures may be subject revision on the timely guidance of the national health authorities and international organizations on the spread of coronavirus, in order to ensure safety of all residents.

(Source: The Peninsula)

Monday, 2 March 2020

‘A step away from hell’: The young male refugees selling sex to survive

Photographer Heba Khamis spent a year and a half documenting the lives of ‘black birds’: the male Afghan and Iranian sex workers in Berlin’s Tiergarten
All photographs by Heba Khamis

The allure of romance is never far away in Berlin’s Tiergarten park, a vast 520-acre expanse home to manicured lawns, dense forest, a picturesque boating lake and the city zoo. As families lay out picnics and millennials fire up barbecues, those seeking something more illicit head to the park’s wooded north, where young male Afghan and Iranian refugees can be found selling sex to the hundreds of buyers who pass through Tiergarten each day.
Jochen* (71) and Mohamed* (21) sit in the Tiergarten

In 2017, Egyptian photographer Heba Khamis was studying in Hanover when a flurry of news reports about Tiergarten’s young male refugees made national headlines. “No one could get [photographic] access to the guys, but the German media were saying they were dangerous and to stay away [from them], that they were doing bad stuff,” said Khamis. “I felt I needed to see for myself.”

Initially accompanied by a male Farsi-speaking friend, Khamis spent ages searching for the refugees in Tiergarten, asking random park-goers if they’d seen or heard anything “unusual”. She stumbled upon a pair of ping-pong players, who said they knew nothing about the prostitution in the park, yet as Khamis spent more time in Tiergarten it became clear that the ping-pong tables and the area around them were at the very heart of the sexual activity. “If you didn’t pay any attention, you wouldn’t notice it,” says Khamis, 31. “But the prostitution was happening right in front of them [around the public toilets]. The elephant was in the room and no one wanted to see it.”
Mohamed, top, is one of many refugees who pretend to be gay or to have converted to Christianity to help strengthen his case for asylum. Obaied, 25, bottom, also works in a Chinese fast food van in another city


Khamis began to visit the park every day and, through persistence and with the aid of translators, managed to make contact with the “boys”, most of whom were ethnic Shia Hazaras from Afghanistan, a minority long persecuted by the Taliban, ranging in age from 15 to 32. Although they were wary of the press, one of the men, Ali*, became Khamis’s go-to guide, introducing her to other boys in the park and their collective way of life. Over the course of a year and a half, she ended up watching – and documenting – as relationships blossomed, long-awaited papers came through and the boys moved out of the park, or didn’t.

Germany legalised prostitution in 2002 and, in 2017, passed a law requiring sex workers to register with local authorities in order to prevent human trafficking and exploitation. But the 30-odd Afghan and Iranian men Khamis was photographing fell under no such support system, as refugees are barred from working legally or attending school while they wait for their documents. “When you are a refugee without papers, and you are Muslim and come from a background where gay sex is shameful and taboo, it is a very different situation,” she says. “These guys don’t represent ‘prostitution in Germany’ in any way. There are only a few of them, and this is a very different scenario.”

Heavily saturated in earthy browns and greens, Khamis’s photos have an eerily ethereal quality, the dappled light of the forest reflecting off the boys’ necklaces, their youth made evident by their protruding clavicles and bony backs.
‘I don’t steal, I don’t disrespect people, but I have to earn money,’ says Ali

The result is deeply unsettling, reflecting the boys’ experience of the park. “Once you are in the park,” says one of Khamis’s subjects Ahmed, an Afghan who had been selling sex in the park for three years, “you are one little step away from hell.” For Khamis, the boys’ search for belonging and humanity was what compelled her to continue photographing.

“When you look at them, [you can see] they’re not enjoying it at all. They hurt themselves, they have depression. On all of them you will find [self-inflicted] cigarette burns or cuts. Everyone wants to get out of the park.”

Drugs feature heavily in the boys’ lives, numbing them and providing a small respite from the agony of waiting to become “legal”, says Khamis. As Germany prioritises assistance to refugees from countries with an ongoing conflict, asylum seekers’ papers from non-conflict countries such as Afghanistan and Iran take longer to complete, and the applicants are more likely to be deported, says Khamis.
Hashem sleeps in the park

The singularity of their situation – engaging in culturally taboo work while waiting in political limbo – inspired Khamis to call the boys “black birds”, a nod to both the numerous blackbirds in the park and a play on the term “black sheep”. “When you are different in the family, you are the ‘black sheep’, and for me these guys were the same: their whole lives they’ve been undocumented, unable to ‘fly’, unable to live normal lives, unable to find anywhere that will accept them.”
  • The female public toilet is often used for sexual encounters. (bottom ) Mujtaba is an Afghan refugee born in Iran. If deported, he will be sent to Afghanistan, a country he has never seen


While some boys were lucky enough to get their papers and move out of the refugee camps or even the park itself, others were required to find another means of escape. For some that meant entering into relationships with their regular buyers (the photo of one such couple won Khamis second prize in the 2019 World Press Photo portraits category), or converting to Christianity as means of claiming political asylum. Still others have remained in Tiergarten.
Omran lost his father, sister and brother when their house was bombed by the Taliban when he was six years old


Khamis began her photographic career covering the 2011 and 2013 revolutions in Egypt, then turned her focus to socially taboo subjects relating to the body, such as breast ironing in Cameroon and Egypt’s transgender community. The practice of focusing on such “unacceptable” issues has transformed her as a person, she says.

“When you work long term on stories it’s not just one image you deliver, you invest your whole life in these stories and they teach you lessons and change you in the long run,” says Khamis.
Roman receives €239 (£200) a month in social aid. After paying his bills, he has around €40 left. He works in the park when he runs out of money

“You become less and less judgmental. You no longer look at things from the surface of your own perspective; you try to see through the people instead. From outside [Tiergarten], you could look at these boys and say, ‘Go work in the black market instead [of doing sex work]’. But they have fought their whole lives, first being born in Afghanistan, then fleeing to Iran and finally to Europe, thinking they will have a nice life at last. Yet they no longer have a home – or a destination.

“This is [what] human failure [looks like]: sometimes we all fight so hard for something that once we finally arrive, we’re so tired from fighting that we just surrender.”

* All subjects’ names have been changed to protect identities.

(Source: The Guardian)

Saturday, 29 February 2020

Qatar cofirms first case of Coronavirus in the country

Qatar has recorded its first confirmed case of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) on 29 February 2020, said the Minister of Public Health on Saturday.

The Ministry said in a statement today that the patient is a 36-year-old Qatari male who returned recently from the Islamic Republic of Iran. He was evacuated out of the country on a government-chartered plane and along with all other passengers has been under full quarantine, and has been admitted to Communicable Disease Center and isolated under strict infection control measures, the statement said adding that he is in a stable condition.

The statement explained that given the nature of the coronavirus and the extent of the global spread, finding a case in Qatar was expected, stressing that the ministry began examining all persons closely related to the patient and implementing appropriate quarantine measures, adding that there is currently no evidence of the spread of the virus in the country. Efforts are currently focused on examining incoming travelers in all the country's entry points, the statement has stressed.

The Ministry of Public Health is taking all measures to limit the further spread of the virus and asks the public to take caution and implement the simple protective measures by frequent washing of hands or using hand sanitizer, avoiding sick people, keeping social distancing and coughing or sneezing into the sleeve of a flexed elbow or use a tissue which then should be discarded into a closed bin.

The Ministry also advises all those who have been in any of the countries where the virus has been reported in the last 14 days and suffer from cough and fever to come forward for testing or to call the hotline of the Ministry of Public Health at 16000.

The Ministry of Public Health is working closely with all partners and with the World Health Organisation to ensure the implementation of latest guidelines and the appropriate public health measures and asks the public to regularly check the ministry's website for the latest advisories and information.


The Ministry of Public Health urges the public to extend their help and cooperation with the health authorities in the implementation of the public heath measures and cautions against listening to unreliable sources of information and rumors. 

(Source: Qatar Tribune)